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In the Name of the International:
The Supreme Court of Canada and the
Internationalist Transformation of
Canadian Private International Law
ROBERT WAI

PART 1: INTRODUCTION

G

lobalization and internationalization are pervasive in contemporary cultural, political, and economic policy discourses. Not
surprisingly, a concern with internationalization and globalization
increasingly characterizes the policy discourses of law. While the law
often operates at a lag to broader social trends, it is sometimes more
active in constituting such trends. This article is concerned with
a striking episode of legal change oriented towards the perceived
new realities of the international system, which occurred in the
unlikely venue of private international law in Canada.
In a tetralogy of four cases released from 1990 to 1994,1 the

Supreme Court of Canada transformed the subject of private international law in terms of doctrine, policy, and overall approach. The
speed and comprehensiveness of reform, change of direction in
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1995, and an SJ.D. dissertation, which was submitted in 2ooo, to Harvard Law
School. My thanks for funding for graduate work that was provided by a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council Doctoral Fellowship, a Law Foundation of
British Columbia Graduate Fellowship, a Canada-US Fulbright Scholarship, and
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gratefully acknowledge the comments on relevant chapters of the dissertation by
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MorguardInvestments Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077 [hereinafter Morguard]; Amchem ProductsInc. v. British Columbia (WCB), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 897 [hereinafter Amchem]; Huntv. T & Nplc, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289 [hereinafter Hunt]; and
Tolofson v.Jensen; Lucas (Litigation Guardianof) v. Gagnon, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022
[hereinafter Tolofson].
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policy orientation, and significance for related fields such as constitutional federalism are exceptional for common law reform in
Canada. While not dramatic in comparison with, for example, the
promulgation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
in 198 2, 2 the changes are significant given that they occurred in a
legal subject that is dominated by judicial rather than legislative
reform and one that has tended to change incrementally, if at all.
As Peter North observed just before the tetralogy was released,
change in private international law in Commonwealth jurisdictions
3
was based on 'reform, but not revolution.
As notable as the doctrinal changes for the particular field of private international law are the multiple ways in which the tetralogy
of Supreme Court of Canada judgments are connected to larger
forces that are crucial for legal decision-making in Canada, in particular, the forces of internationalization and globalization. The
effort of law-makers, including judges, to grapple with the consequences of significant levels of political, economic, cultural, and
personal connections that cross national borders is a defining
aspect of Canadian law-making today. The tetralogy is an excellent
chance to examine the ways in which judges have responded to, and
helped to shape, the processes of globalization. In particular, the
tetralogy offers a striking study in judicial activism in reforming
4
laws in the name of the international.
The tetralogy of cases in Canada has not gone unnoticed. Both
commentators and lower courts have wrestled with the significant
issues broached by these cases. Moreover, there is a strong sense
that the judgments constitute an unusual break in the normal activity in the field. Commentaries have proliferated, both critical and
supportive, focusing on a number of angles, including the constitutional issues. 5 However, less attention has been paid to the study of
the role of the Supreme Court of Canada in actively instituting
legal reform that responds to, and helps to construct, Canadian law
in an era of globalization. 6
2

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part i of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K), 1982, c.

P. North, "Reform but Not Revolution"

(1990) 22o

11.

Rec. des Cours 1.

For a critical assessment of Canadian policy reform instituted "in the name of
globalization," see J. Laxer, False God: How the Globalization Myth Has Imperiled
Canada(Toronto: Lester, 1993) at 3.
See, for example, E. Edinger, "The Constitutionalization of the Conflict of Laws"
(1995) 25 Can. Bus. L.J. 38.
For a model examination of the crucial role of the European Court ofJustice in
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The judgments of the tetralogy show how the global becomes the
local in Canadian legal life. Public international lawyers and international policymakers have often overlooked private law as an
important venue for diplomacy and legislation. Yet private international law cases are an example of how international concerns can
"touch down" in the lives and practice of lawyers and citizens who
do not specialize in international relations. Almost all practising
lawyers must have some familiarity with the conflict of laws - something that is still largely untrue of subjects of public international
law, such as the laws of war or the laws of international trade regulation. In addition, an understanding of the arguments concerning
the international realm in the tetralogy provides useful insight to
those persons who face similar international considerations in subjects such as trade law, immigration, or criminal law.7 At the most
general level, the understanding of the international in the tetralogy feeds into, and evidences the importance in a particular legal
field of, the debate about how Canadian society should respond to
globalization and internationalization.
For scholars interested more generally in globalization, the
Canadian tetralogy provides a concrete and particular study of the
importance of ideas and beliefs to the reception and shaping of
globalization processes. 8 As common law judgments, the tetralogy

7

actively constructing the process of European integration, seeJ.H.H. Weiler, 'The
Transformation of Europe" (1991) 1oo Yale L.J. 2403. I explore the activist role
of the Supreme Court of Canada under the leadership of Justice Ghrard La Forest in internationalist reform in private international law as well as in other areas
of Canadian law in R. Wai, 'Justice Ghrard La Forest and the Internationalist
Turn in CanadianJurisprudence," in R.Johnson andJ. McEvoy, eds., G~rardV La
Forest at the Supreme Court of Canada 1985-1997 (Winnipeg: Supreme Court of
Canada Historical Society by the Canadian Legal History Project, 2000) 421.
The connection of the judgments in private international law to decisions in
other areas of Canadian law is explored in.Wai, supra note 6.
Legal studies of globalization can offer helpful detail to more amorphous and
abstract studies of globalization and internationalization. From this perspective,
this article is an effort to provide a "thick" description of a particular episode in
the processes of globalization and internationalization, showing one venue
where that process is reflected and instituted, and showing as well the connection
of this episode to some of the larger social contexts and policy issues at stake in
globalization. This is the approach invoked by many as the way forward for studies of globalization; see, for example, P. Cheah and B. Robbins, eds., Cosmopolitics:
Thinking and Feeling beyond the Nation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1998). The concept of thick description is associated with the cultural
anthropologist Clifford Geertz; see, for example, C. Geertz, LocalKnowledge:FurtherEssays in InterpretiveAnthropology (New York: Basic Books, 1983).
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provides the opportunity to study texts that record the ideational
character of globalization as the judges attempt to provide public
reasons for their decisions. These judgments therefore provide
an opportunity that is not available to more general, abstract, or
macro-oriented studies of globalization. 9 A more detailed examination of the policy argumentation in the tetralogy with respect
to international matters will hopefully bring out more clearly the
manner in which the law both responds to and constructs the
processes of globalization. It will also highlight some of the significant dangers and biases that might operate when internationalist
reform occurs with inadequate attention to specific conditions.
To this end, the article proceeds in six stages. This introduction
constitutes the first part. In the second part, the tetralogy of cases
is described and the underlying policy views of the international
are identified in key passages of the judgments. The third part of
the article then compares two "modes' of internationalization in
law - internationalization by international treaty and internationalization by "policy consciousness" - arguing that the tetralogy is
a good example of the latter. The fourth part describes the main
features of the overall approach to international matters contained
in the tetralogy, identifying three strands of policy argumentation
related to (i) an economic objective of facilitating international
commerce; (2) a political objective of aiding interstate cooperation; and (3)a moral objective of promoting cosmopolitan fairness. It is then suggested that this vision of the international is
similar to the vision found in three traditions of internationalism.
The first tradition is the intellectual tradition of liberal internationalism, with its commitment to free trade, peaceful interstate
cooperation, and cosmopolitan individualism. The second tradition is the national tradition of Canadian internationalism in
A sense of the peculiar opportunity offered to study both the ideational and material aspects of globalization and its construction might explain the interest in
fields related to private international law and international business law recently
evidenced by leading figures from other disciplines who specialize in globalization such as the sociologists Pierre Bourdieu and Yves Dezalay (see, for example,
P. Bourdieu, "Foreword," in Y Dezalay and B. Garth, eds., Dealing in Virtue:
InternationalCommercial Arbitration and the Construction of a TransnationalLegal
Order (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1996)), the systems theorist Gunther
Teubner (see, for example, G. Teubner, ed., Global Law without a State (Aldershot,
UK Dartmouth, 1997)), and the political economist Saskia Sassen (see, for
example, S. Sassen, LosingControl?Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1996); S. Sassen, Globalization and Its Discontents:
Essays on the New Mobility of People and Money (New York: New Press, 1998)).
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national identity, foreign policy, and legal culture. The third tradition is the disciplinary tradition of international lawyers committed to the expansion of international law and institutions to
preserve international order and to achieve mutually beneficial
objectives such as liberal international trade.
The fifth part critically analyzes the international public policy
arguments that inform the legal reforms in the cases and identifies
five general dangers in the tetralogy's approach to internationalist
policy argumentation. It is argued that the internationalist public
policy arguments used in the tetralogy are often misunderstood
and naively applied by legal decision-makers, such as lower courts
who must wrestle with the legacy of the tetralogy while lacking significant experience in addressing international affairs. At certain
points in the tetralogy, the Supreme Court of Canada may have
itself overstated the nature of the policy arguments for internationalization and reached decisions that contain contestable analyses
of internationalization. I will attempt to show how countervailing
or alternative considerations are relevant to each of the political,
economic, and moral objectives that inform the legal reforms of
the tetralogy.
A focus on the Supreme Court of Canada judgments demonstrates how a particular understanding and version of internationalism can occupy the space of "the" internationalist understanding
of legal reform. Internationalism, like justice or fairness or the
right, is contestable discursive terrain. There are in fact many internationalisms, each consisting of distinctive visions and priorities. It
will be argued that the internationalist commitments in the tetralogy have controversial features, including a narrow commitment to
transnational commerce, a naive understanding of interstate cooperation, and a shallow sense of cosmopolitan fairness to individuals. Although the Supreme Court of Canada judgments themselves
may have used these internationalist objectives effectively in the
tetralogy, in other cases these goals may be overstated and conflict
with other legitimate goals, such as justice to individual parties and
effective social regulation. The continuing development and usage
of these cases requires a careful understanding of the nature and
the limits of the vision of the international expressed in these cases.
I conclude the fifth section of this article, therefore, by articulating
several general cautions about using the internationalist reasoning
in the tetralogy.
The article closes in its sixth section with a discussion of two
specific issues in private international law in order to demonstrate
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what it would mean to have a richer discourse about international
public policy in the development of Canadian private international
law. While some key issues have been decided, many doctrinal
issues remain to be resolved and the room for argumentation, even
within seemingly settled doctrinal areas, remains very broad. A
more critical approach to internationalist economic, political, and
moral argumentation will hopefully encourage judges, legislators,
practitioners, and commentators to deploy a more sophisticated
understanding of the international system and its demands - an
approach that rejects both naive internationalism and naive antiinternationalism. A legacy of sophisticated arguments about Canadian law in an international age would be still more significant than
the already substantial reforms achieved by the tetralogy.
PART 2: THE TETRALOGY OFJUDGMENTS IN PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE SUPREME COURT
OF CANADA

It is widely acknowledged that the field of conflict of laws in
Canada, which has traditionally been very stable, is now undergoing dramatic changes.' 0 Legal change in this area is clearly identified with several decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada after
years of limitedjurisprudence from the court on conflict of laws. In
particular, basic change was accomplished in a tetralogy of cases
that include MorguardInvestments Ltd. v. De Savoye, Amchem Products
Inc. v. British Columbia (WCB), Hunt v. T&N plc, and Tolofson v.
Jensen.1" In these cases, the Supreme Court of Canada effected dramatic reform in each of the main subjects of the conflict of laws:
recognition and enforcement, jurisdiction, and choice of law. It
also made a crucial ruling concerning the conduct of discovery in
inter-jurisdictional litigation. At the same time, the court instituted
two fundamental changes in approach to the subject: first, it gave
constitutional status to at least some of the rules of private international law and, second, it forcefully emphasized the importance of
international public policy arguments in reasoning about private
international law in Canada.
The following summary of the four judgments of the Supreme
Court of Canada is not focused on the doctrinal implications of the
10 See, for example,J-G. Castel, CanadianConflict ofLaws, 4 th ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1997) C. 2; M. Baer, et al., eds., PrivateInternationalLaw in Common Law
Canada(Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1997) at 4.
1 All of these cases are cited in note 1.
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decisions.12 Rather, I focus on the language used in the decisions
and observe that the judgments share a common vision of the international realm, which is argued to necessitate reform of the rules
of private international law, both within the Canadian federation
and at the international level.
MORGUARD INVESTIENTS LTD. V. DE SAVOYE

13

The Supreme Court of Canada's judgment in Morguard is the
foundationaljudgment for contemporary private international law
in Canada, and it has become one of the most-cited and influential
decisions in the theory and practice of Canadian law of the last
decade. Morguard addressed the common law rules for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in Canada. The case
concerned a defaultjudgment rendered against a British Columbia
defendant in an Alberta court. The plaintiff sought recognition
and enforcement of the judgment in British Columbia, while the
defendant relied on the lack of jurisdiction of the Alberta court,
given his lack of presence or submission. A unanimous Supreme
Court of Canada rejected the defence and held that Canadian common law courts should consider only whether the other state has
a "real and substantial connection" to the action.14 Morguard,thus,
substantially increases the risk to defendants of following the common strategy of refusing to appear in the courts of ajurisdiction in
which a plaintiff has commenced an action, thus permitting a
15
defaultjudgment to be made against them.
15 This is admirably done in a number of case comments and articles, some of
which are referred to in the notes following; more generally, see Castel, supra
note so, especially c. 2.
11 Morguard, supranote i. For case commentary, see "Symposium: Recognition of
Extraprovincial and Foreign Judgments" (1993) 22 Can. Bus. L.J. 1; J. Blom,
"Conflict of Laws - Enforcement of Extraprovincial DefaultJudgments - Real
and Substantial Connection: MorguardInvestments Ltd. v. De Savoye" (1991) 70
Can. Bar Rev. 733; P. Glenn, "Foreign Judgments, the Common Law and the
Constitution: De Savoyev. MorguardInvestments Ltd." (1992) 37 McGill L.J. 537.
14 Morguard,supra note 1 at 1104-1o.
11 The uncertainty generated and the lowered standard meant that it would be
very difficult for counsel to advise a client not to defend abroad. Moreover, once
defence was begun, it is arguable that the party could be said to have voluntarily
submitted. See Blom, supra note 13. The United States faced a similar situation
at the International Court ofJustice [hereinafter ICJ] in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and againstNicaragua, [1986] I.C.J. Rep. 14. The United States,
by arguing on the jurisdiction point, was taken by some of the judges to have voluntarily submitted on the merits. This questionable interpretation of the nature
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The reasoning in the judgment is of special interest because the
court identified some of the general policy issues that it perceived
to be at stake in the area of conflict of laws. The language used has
often been cited by both lower courts 6 and by the Supreme Court
of Canada itself in subsequent cases.1 7 Justice Gerard La Forest,
writing for the unanimous court, observed that
[t] he common law regarding the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments is firmly anchored in the principle of territoriality as interpreted and applied by the English courts in the 19 th Century ... This
principle reflects the fact, one of the basic tenets of international law, that
sovereign states have exclusive jurisdiction in their own territory. As a
concomitant to this, states are hesitant to exercise jurisdiction over matters that may take place in the territory of other states ... The English
approach, we saw, was unthinkingly adopted by the courts
of this country,
8
even in relation to judgments given in sister provinces.'
Justice La Forest expressed serious doubts that the common law
rules based on the English rules concerning recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments remained appropriate for the
Canadian federation. However, he went much further by undertaking an analysis of the traditional rules of recognition and enforcement under contemporary international conditions:
Modern states, however, cannot live in splendid isolation and do give effect
to judgments given in other countries in certain circumstances ... This, it
was thought, was in conformity with the requirements of comity, the
informing principle of private international law, which has been stated to
be the deference and respect due by other states to the actions of a state
legitimately taken within its territory ...
... the real nature of the idea of comity, an idea based not simply on
respect for the dictates of a foreign sovereign, but on the convenience, nay
necessity, in a world where legal authority is divided among sovereign
states of adopting a doctrine of this kind ...
For my part, I much prefer the more complete formulation of the idea of
comity adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States in Hilton v.
Guiyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), at pp.163-4:
of ICJ jurisdiction has been severely criticized: see, for example, M. Reisman,
Systems of Controlin InternationalAdjudication andArbitration (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 1992) c. 2.
16See "Symposium: Recognition of Extraprovincial and ForeignJudgments," supra

note 13; J. Sullivan, "The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in B.C. - Ten
Years after Morguard" (2oo1) 59 The Advocate 399.
17 For example, in Amchem, supra note i at 913-14; Hunt, supra note i at 32 1-28;
Tolofson, supra note 1 at 1048-49.
IS Morguard, supra note i at 1095.
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... "Comity" in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation,
on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But
it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard
both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its9own
citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.'
Having invoked comity as the underlying international policy
behind the traditional rules concerning recognition and enforcement, Justice La Forest signalled how the policy of comity and the
rules connected with it must be adapted to a new international society in which the normative, economic, and political conditions of
sovereignty have changed:
The world has changed since the above rules were developed in i 9 th century England. Modern means of travel and communications have made
many of these 19 th century concerns appear parochial. The business
community operates in a world economy and we correctly speak of a world
community even in the face of decentralized political and legal power.
Accommodating the flow of wealth, skills and people across state lines has
now become imperative. Under these circumstances, our approach to the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments would appear ripe for
reappraisal. Certainly, other countries, notably the United States and
members of the European Economic Community, have adopted more
generous rules for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
to the general advantage of litigants.20
These extraordinary passages are among the most important
statements made by Canadian courts about the nature of contemporary international society. In addition, Justice La Forest's judgment posits a strong connection between the reform of particular
rules on recognition and enforcement and this vision of new international realities. Specifically, he indicates that recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments by common law courts should
occur so long as there is a "real and substantial connection"
between the foreign court that has given the judgment and the
action.2 ' This test effects a more generous approach because "the
22
most real and substantial connection is not required."
Since the case involved two common law provinces of CanadaJustice La Forest also surveyed a range of issues related to federalism.
19Ibid. at 1095-96.
Ibid. at 1o98.

20
"

"

Ibid. at 1 o8-o9. For a cautious critique of some ambiguities of this approach,
see Blom, supra note 13.
Castel, supra note i o at 44.
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First, he signalled that the conditions of an international society are
at least as present in the federal context, namely that the movement
of wealth, skills, and peoples is a social reality and an accepted
objective in Canada. 23 Second, he signalled that the reform of these
rules would be consistent with the constitution of Canada. He cited
an assortment of constitutional provisions, including mobility
rights under section 6 of the Charter and the little-used federal customs union provision, section 12 1 of the Constitution Act, 1867.24
These passages of the judgment suggested to many observers that
the court was indicating that the Canadian constitution might
require certain rules in the conflict of laws. 25 In the recognition and
enforcement context, the judgment in Morguard seems to accept
that the Canadian constitution contained provisions not unlike the
26
US constitution's "full faith and credit" clause.
The judgment left open several key issues. First, the exact contours of the real and substantial test were vague and were left to
be developed gradually by lower courts. 27 Second, it was unclear
whether the more generous approach to judgments from other
Canadian provinces should also apply to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments from outside Canada. 28 Third, it
was unclear whether the private international law rules were constitutionalized, given that it was unnecessary for the court to determine that issue in order to reach its decision on the case.
For the purposes of this article, however, what is central is the
nature of the influential policy arguments about the international
23 J.McEvoy, "Federalism, Territorialism and Justice La Forest," in Johnson and

McEvoy, supranote 6 at 345.
24 Morguard,supra note 1 at 1o99. Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K), 30 & 31 Vict., c.
3,reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5.
25 Scholars of Canadian constitutional law and conflict of laws had been speculating on this possibility in the years preceeding Morguard. In particular, see
J Swan, "The Canadian Constitution, Federalism and the Conflict of Laws"
(1985) 63 Can. Bar Rev. 2 71 and V. Black, "Enforcement ofJudgments and the
Conflict of Laws" (1989) 9 OxfordJ. Leg. Studies 547, cited by the court in
Morguard,supranote i at 1094.
2' Article IV.1 of the US constitution provides that "[f] ull faith and Credit shall be
given in each State to the public Acts, Records andJudicial Proceedings of every
other State."
27 See Blom, supra note 13.
28 Lower courts have subsequently applied Morguardwith respect to non-Canadian

judgments; see J. Blom, 'The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Morguard
Goes Forth into the World" (1997) 28 Can. Bus. L.J. 373.
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that were expressed in Morguard- policy arguments whose influence I will track in the succeeding judgments.
AMCHEM PRODUCTSINC. V. BRITISH COLUMBIA
(WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD)

29

The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Amchem is a crucial decision in a relatively discrete area of conflict of laws, namely
the standards for issuance of anti-suit injunctions. In addition, the
judgment has implications for the subject ofjurisdiction more generally. The case concerned asbestos litigation in which a number of
plaintiffs, most of whom were resident in British Columbia at the
time of injury, brought suit in the state of Texas against a number of
corporate defendants. The plaintiffs included the Workers' Compensation Board of British Columbia, which had subrogated interests by virtue of having paid disability or death benefits to workers
whose health had allegedly been adversely affected by asbestos. On
a motion by the defendants, the British Columbia Supreme Court
in chambers issued an anti-suit injunction restraining the plaintiffs
from continuing the US tort litigation.
In contrast to Morguard, the Supreme Court of Canada was dealing with an international dispute rather than a federal dispute.
Moreover, Texas has been one of the most aggressive jurisdictions
in the United States in assuming jurisdiction and has become a
forum of choice for plaintiffs from all over North America and the
world. The British Columbia courts and the Supreme Court of
Canada, then, were wrestling with ajurisdiction that was perceived
to be one of the most assertive in the world.
The history of asbestos litigation, of which this case was a part,
made the outcome in Amchem that much more striking. Through
the 198os and 199os, the proceedings on the tort claims had been
dominated by complicated procedural strategies. Indeed, the procedural complexity of the litigation has generated a number of
leading rulings on civil procedure and litigation practice, including two of the core decisions of the tetralogy3 ° The procedural
2 Amchem, supra note 1. For commentary, see E. Edinger, "Conflict of Laws -

Dis-

cretionary Principles - Forum Non Conveniens - Anti-Suit Injunctions:
Amchem ProductsInc. v. British Columbia (Workers Compensation Board)" (1993) 72
Can. Bar Rev. 366.
o In Canada, litigation and legislation related to asbestos has been the source of
many leading decisions testing the limits of the rules of civil procedure, including the conflict of laws. The Supreme Court of Canada had heard only a few
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manoeuvring at times rivalled that of such famous jurisdictional
battles between United States and Commonwealth judges as the
LakerAirwaysv. Sabenalitigation."' In the background to the Amchem
case were a series of injunctions by the British Columbia and the
Texas courts that included anti-suit injunctions, anti-anti suit in32
junctions, and, arguably, an anti-anti-anti suit injunction.
The issue directly before the court was the appropriate standard
for the granting of an anti-suit injunction. The unanimous judgment of the five-member court, written by Justice John Sopinka
but with Justice La Forest notable among the concurring members
of the court, sets a very high standard for the granting of antisuit injunctions. The test to be used has two stages. First, a court
should consider whether the foreign court "could reasonably have
concluded that there was no alternative forum that was clearly
more appropriate."'31 In the second stage, a court should consider
whether the injunction would "deprive the plaintiff of advantages4
in the foreign forum of which it would be unjust to deprive him."'
Justice Sopinka noted that the result of these principles would be
that no anti-suit injunction would be granted in situations where
the "foreign court assumes jurisdiction on a basis that generally
conforms to our rule of private international law relating to the
forum non conveniens.35
Among the identified policy reasons for this restrictive standard
for granting anti-suit injunctions were concerns of comity. Justice
Sopinka quoted the definition of comity from Justice La Forest's
years earlier an asbestos litigation case on the standard for dismissal of an action
for failure to state a cause of action; Huntv. Carey CanadaInc., [1990] 2 S.C.R.
959. Hunt, supra note i arose out of the same asbestos litigation. Asbestos even

plays a role in Canadian litigiousness at the interstate level of the World Trade
Organization [hereinafter WTO]; see, for example, European Communities Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-ContainingProducts, 18 September 2000,
Doc. WT/DSI 3 5 /R (Panel Report), 12 March 2oo, Doc. WT/DS1 3 5 /AB/R
(Appellate Body Report), in which Canada unsuccessfully challenged French
restrictions on the import of asbestos and asbestos products.

31 LakerAirwaysv. Sabena, Belgian WorldAirlines, 731 F. 2d 9 0 9 (1984). For a description of the Laker Airways litigation, see L. Collins, Essays in InternationalLitigation
and the Conflict of Laws (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) at i io-i6. The
reaction of the US court in the Laker Airways litigation is mentioned in Amchem,
supranote i at 913.
11 Amchem, supra note i at 905-08.
11 Ibid. at 932.

4 Ibid., quoting from SNIAhrospatialev. LeeKuiJak, [1987] 1 A.C. 871 (H.L) [hereinafter Aerospatiale].
15 Ibid. at 9 3 4 .
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judgment in Morguard3 6 and observed that anti-suit injunctions are
generally considered to be inconsistent with comity. Although antisuit injunctions are still needed because of the injustice that might
be caused by courts of otherjurisdictions inappropriately assuming
jurisdiction,Justice Sopinka observed that Canadian courts should
only entertain such applications where a "serious injustice will be
occasioned as a result of the failure of a foreign court to decline
37
jurisdiction."
In the course of its judgment, the court confirmed the use of the
forum non conveniens doctrine in Canada. Under the test for forum
non conveniens, a court should grant a stay of proceedings if "the
existence of a more appropriate forum" is clearly established. 38 The
status of this doctrine had been unclear. An earlier Supreme Court
of Canada case had signalled that it might be applicable in Canada,
and many lower courts and academic commentators had supported
it.3 9 In Amchem, the Supreme Court of Canada approved of the use
of the doctrine both in situations of service ex juris and in applications for a stay of proceedings. In its judgment, the court cited
two House of Lords decisions of Lord Goff, SpiliadaMaritimeCorp. v.
Cansulex Ltd. and SNIAdrospatialev. Lee KuiJak, which reformed the
English rules with respect to forum non conveniens and to anti-suit
injunctions. 40 In citing the House of Lords and Privy Council decisions so closely, as well as in its detailed survey of the English,
United States, and Australian laws on anti-suit injunctions, the
Supreme Court of Canada evidenced its comfort with continuing
the well-established Canadian practice ofjudicial borrowing from
41
foreign courts.
The judgments in this case are less notable than the combination of the doctrines and the application in this particular case.
The House of Lords decision in Spiliadaand the Privy Council decision in Adrospatiale changed the English tests, but, in their application to the facts, the House of Lords signalled a much less deferential attitude. Ironically, the House of Lords in Spiliada refused to
36 Ibid. at 914-15.
37
38

Ibid. at 915.
Ibid. at 92 1.

11 Antares ShippingCorp.v. The Ship "Capricorn," [1977] 2 S.C.R. 422.
40 Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd., [1987] 1 A.C. 460 (H.L.) [hereinafter
41

Spiliada];Aerospatiale, supranote 34.
See G.V. La Forest, 'The Use of International and Foreign Material in the
Supreme Court of Canada," in Proceedings of the 1988 Conference of the Canadian
Council of InternationalLaw (Ottawa: Canadian Council on International Law,
1988) 230.
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grant a stay of proceedings in England on forum non conveniens
grounds in which British Columbia was the other jurisdiction with
strong connections to the litigation. 42 Moreover, in Airospatiale,the
Privy Council held that an anti-suit injunction should be granted
against a Texas court, which was the same jurisdiction that was
involved in the Amchem case.
In the Amchem case, the Supreme Court of Canada was dealing
with the courts of Texas, but, unlike the Privy Council in Adrospatiale,it applied the highly deferential standard it set out as the
rule. The Supreme Court of Canada did so even though the Texas
43
courts did not have at the time a doctrine of forum non conveniens,
a fact that seemed significant to the granting of the anti-suit injunction by both the trial court and the British Columbia Court of
Appeal. 44 The trial court also seemed troubled by the anti-anti suit
injunction that had been granted by the Texas court. In contrast,
the Supreme Court of Canada, acting in a magnanimous fashion,
focused on the issue of whether the Texas court had, on the particular facts at stake, acted in an unjust way. It concluded that while
Texas did not have a forum non conveniens doctrine, it was not a
clearly inappropriate forum in this case. There was enough of a
connection that the court, while it may not have agreed that Texas
was the best forum for the trial of these claims, gave the Texas court
significant deference and refused to grant the anti-suit injunction.
Amchem carried the logic of the Morguard decision into the area
ofjurisdiction. By approving a lower standard for forum non conveniens and a high standard for anti-suit injunctions, thejudgment set
Canadian courts on a path wherein the assumption ofjurisdiction
was to be much more deferential towards foreign courts. Moreover,
the Amchem decision suggested that the new generous, cooperative
attitude of Canadian courts, which was developed in the Morguard
decision, would apply vis-d-vis non-Canadian courts, including courts
45
from even the most aggressive foreign jurisdictions.
42 See Spiliada, supranote 40 at 485-88.
41 See L. Silberman, "Developments in Jurisdiction and Forum Non Conveniens in

International Litigation: Thoughts on Reform and a Proposal for a Uniform
Standard" (1993) 28 Tex. Int'l L.J. 501.
14 See the discussion of the lower courtjudgments, Amchem, supra note i at 91 o-i 1.
45 The willingness of the Canadian courts to accept forum non conveniens and to
restrict anti-suit injunctions without seeking reciprocity generated favourable, if
surprised, commentary in the United States; see, for example, A. Lowenfeld,
"Forum Shopping, Antisuit Injunctions, Negative Declarations, and Related
Tools of International Litigation" ( 997) 91 Am. Int'l L. 314 at 323-24.
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HUNTV. T&NPLC

In Hunt, the Supreme Court of Canada addressed the procedural barriers to the conduct of cross-border civil litigation placed
by a blocking statute. Provisions of the Quebec Business Concerns
Records Act 47 prohibited the removal of documents from Qu&bec for purposes of discovery in asbestos litigation proceedings
in British Columbia. The case therefore concerned a procedural
statute that could act as an effective barrier to litigation in a forum
that had valid connections to the suit as well as being the forum
chosen by the plaintiff. The British Columbia courts, on motions of
the plaintiff for orders of discovery against the Qu6bec defendants,
ruled that the blocking statute of the sister province had to be
respected. In order to avoid putting the defendants in an untenable
position, no discovery order would be made by the British Columbia court.
In the Supreme Court of Canada, the majority concluded that
the Quebec Business Concerns Records Act was constitutionally
inapplicable with respect to litigation in another Canadian province. It left unclear whether these constitutional limits would also
apply with respect to litigation in a non-Canadianjurisdiction. The
judgment of the court, again written byJustice La Forest, observed
that the clear purpose of the blocking statute was a decision by a
provincial legislature to prevent the successful litigation of claims
against asbestos companies in foreign jurisdictions, particularly
suits in US courts. The fact that the legislature had a clear public
purpose did not seem to argue for deference on the part of the
court. Rather, the court focused on how this purpose was clearly
problematic for international and federal comity:
The whole purpose of a blocking statute is to impede successful litigation
or prosecution in other jurisdictions by refusing recognition and compliance with orders issued there. Everybody realizes that the whole point of
blocking statutes is not to keep documents in the province, but rather to
prevent compliance, and so the success of litigation outside the province
that that province finds objectionable. This is no doubt part of sovereign
46

Hunt, supra note i. For commentary, see V. Black and W. MacKay, "Constitu-

tional Alchemy in the Supreme Court: Huntv. T& Nplc" (1994) 5 N.J.C.L. 79;
C. Walsh, "Conflict of Laws - Enforcement of Extra Provincial Judgments and
InPersonamJurisdictionof Canadian Courts: Hunt v. T &Nplc" (1994) 73 Can.
Bar Rev. 394; Edinger, supranote 5; R. Wisner, "Uniformity, Diversity and Provincial Extraterritoriality" (1995) 40 McGill L.J. 759.
41 Quebec Business Concerns Records Act, R.S.Q., c. D-1 2.
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right, but it certainly runs counter to comity. In the political realm it leads
to strict retaliatory laws and power struggles. And it discourages international commerce and efficient allocation and conduct of litigation. It
that offend against
has similar effects on the interprovincial level, 4effects
8
the basic structure of the Canadian federation.
The blocking statute ran counter to the values of comity, order,
and fairness that had been central to the judgments in Morguard
and Amchem and that had justified reform of the relevant common
law rules. In this appeal, however, statutory provisions passed by a
legislature were at stake rather than common law rules. The court's
decision, therefore, rested on Canadian constitutional provisions
of the federal division of powers, including the interpretation of
provincial powers under section 92, in particular, section 9 2 (1 3),
which concerns "property and civil rights in the Province." Beyond
a "'pith and substance" analysis of section 92 (13) ,Justice La Forest
further invoked the diverse set of constitutional provisions that he
had identified in Morguard and that, for him, provided the basic
structure of the Canadian federation and demonstrated the "obvious intention of the Constitution to create a single country. '49
These diverse constitutional provisions included common citizenship, inter-provincial mobility (reflected in section 6 of the Charter), the Canadian common market (reflected in sections 9 1 (2),
91 (1o), 12 1 and the peace, order, and good government clause),
and the "'unitary structure of the Canadian judicial system with the
Supreme Court of Canada at its apex."
Justice La Forest emphasized, seemingly more than any specific
provision of the constitution, how the use of blocking statutes ran
counter to the basic policies of economic efficiency and equality of
treatment in a federal state:
It is inconceivable that in devising a scheme of union comprising a common market stretching from sea to sea, the Fathers of Confederation
would have contemplated a situation where citizens would be effectively
deprived of access to the ordinary courts in their jurisdiction in respect
of transactions flowing from the existence of that common market. The
resultant higher transactional costs for interprovincial transactions conof the Canadian marketstitute an infringement on the unity and efficiency
51
place ... as well as unfairness to the citizen.
1

Hunt, supra note i at 327.

19 Morguard,supra note 1 at 1O99, cited in Hunt, supra note i at 322.
10 Hunt, supra note i at 322.
1' Ibid. at 330.

Transformationof CanadianPrivateInt'l Law
For the court, the lack of order and fairness of provincial blocking
statutes was highlighted by the fact that the basic rules of civil procedure were the same in the different provinces of Canada. Discovery would be available to a plaintiff if he or she brought an action
in Qu~bec or if both parties to the action had been from British
Columbia, "[b]ut somehow, because of the fortuitous combination of litigation in British Columbia involving a defendant from
52
Quebec or Ontario, the discovery process is barred.
TOLOIESON V. JENSEN; LUCAS (LITIGATION GUARDIAN OF) V. GAGNON

53

The Supreme Court of Canada's judgment in Tolofson completed
the tetralogy by instituting reform in the area of choice of law. In
turning to choice of law, the court addressed perhaps the most
vexed area in conflict of laws: choice of law in tort. Choice of law in
tort poses special difficulties partly because in contrast to crossborder contractual situations there is usually no opportunity for
parties to indicate clearly that their legal relation is connected to
the governing law of a particular jurisdiction. 54 Yet, choice of law
rules in tort are important in private international relations because
of the numerous situations where non-contractually related parties
with connections to different jurisdictions will find themselves
involved in a tort dispute. Moreover, international tort litigation
is frequently large in scale and complex in its international connections. Environmental accidents and defective products, for example,
can cause damage that spreads across manyjurisdictional borders,
especially given contemporary technology and the scope of the
international market. Finally, tort law is the subject of private law
that is most closely associated with broader public policy purposes,
55
including deterrence and punishment.
52

Ibid. at 331.

53 Tolofson, supra note i. For commentary, see J.-G. Castel, "Back to the Future! Is

the New 'Rigid' Choice of Law Rule for Interprovincial Torts Constitutionally
Mandated?" (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall L.J. 35; P. Kincaid, 'Jensen v. Tolofson and
the Revolution in Tort Choice of Law" (1995) 74 Can. Bar Rev. 537.
54 The tort/contract distinction can be overstated. Many disputes involve overlapping claims in contract and tort. Moreover, some tort claims involve situations
with a transactional character where there are possibilities of bilateral bargaining and negotiation; see, for example, M. Whincop and M. Keyes, 'The Market
Tort in Private International Law" (1999) 19 Northwestern J. Int'l L. and
Bus. 215.

-1 It is therefore not surprising that choice of law in tort was central to the development of the "governmental-interest analysis" approach in the United States; see,
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In the United Kingdom and in many Commonwealth jurisdictions, a restrictive "double actionability" rule had prevailed with
respect to choice of law in tort. The rule required that the accident
be actionable under the rules of both the forum state (lexfora) and
the state where the accident occurred (lex loci delicti). The result
was a two-pronged rule that effectively erected two barriers to
recovery by plaintiffs. It was widely believed that this rule had to be
reformed. In the judgment in Tolofson, Justice La Forest clearly signalled his dislike for the old rules:
What strikes me about the Anglo-Canadian choice of law rules as developed over the past century is that they appear to have been applied with
insufficient reference to the underlying reality in which they operate and
to general principles that should apply in responding to that reality. Often
the rules are mechanistically applied. At other times, they seem to be
based on the expectations of the parties, a somewhat fictional concept, or
a sense of "fairness" about the specific case, a reaction that is not subjected
to analysis, but which seems to be born of disapproval of the rule adopted
by a particular jurisdiction. The truth is that a system of law built on what
a particular court considers to be the expectations of the parties or what it
thinks is fair, without engaging in further probing about what
56 it means by
this, does not bear the hallmarks of a rational system of law.
What is notable about the majority judgment that follows is not
that the court chose reform but rather its choice of reform that was
extreme in its simplicity. Following a decision of the Australian
High Court, 57 the Supreme Court of Canada radically moved from
the double actionability rule to a rigid lex loci delictirule. The return
to the rule for choice of law in tort that had applied in the early
twentieth century was a surprising turn to many scholars of Canadian conflict of laws. 58 A number of less rigid alternatives to the lex

for example, Babcock v.Jackson, 12 N.Y 2d 473 (1963); B. Currie, Selected Essays on
the Conflict of Laws (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1963); L. Brilmayer,
Conflict of Laws, 2nd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1995) c. 2.
56 Tolofson, supranote i at 1046-47. For commentary, see, for example, N. Guthrie,
"'A Good Place to Shop': Choice of Forum and the Conflict of Laws" (1995) 27
Ottawa L. Rev. 2o.
57 In particular, the minority concurring opinion of ChiefJustice Mason in Breavington v. Godleman, (1988), 8o A.L.R. 362 (Australia H.C.). The ratio of this case
is almost unascertainable given the multiple judgments pulling in various directions. It is interesting that an equally muddy decision is also a leading case
in English choice of law in tort; Boysv. Chaplin, [1971] A.C. 356 (H.L.). For a
discussion of this case and its background in English choice of law in tort, see
J. Moriis, The Conflict of Laws, 4 th ed. by J.D. McClean (London: Sweet and
Maxwell, 1993) at 28o-91.
58 See, for example, Castel, supra note 53.
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loci delicti rule existed. The idea of the "proper law of the tort," for
example, as developed byJohn Morris, attempted to avoid rigidity
and arbitrariness by assessing the various connecting factors of
the tort to the different jurisdictions.5 9 British legislation, which is
based on proposals of the English and Scottish Law Commissions,
implements rules based on a "place of the accident plus" formulation, which chooses the law of the place of the tort, but with a
number of limited exceptions.6"
The court's reasons for choosing the rigid rule evidences the
priority of certain policy values for contemporary private international law, most of which had already been articulated in earlier
cases of the court.Justice La Forest evoked the reforms in Morguard
and Hunt for the idea that, with respect to rules of recognition
and enforcement andjurisdiction of courts in transactions with ties
to more than a single state, a plaintiff should generally be able
to choose the jurisdiction most convenient to it, because such
choice "fosters mobility and a world economy."6' However, Justice
La Forest also noted that courts have developed rules to restrict
"overreaching," such as the "'real and substantial connection" test
with respect to recognition and enforcement of judgments and
62
forum non conveniens analysis for refusal to exercise jurisdiction.
What choice of law rule in tort is consistent with the view of the
international system that was developed in Morguard,Amchem, and
Hunt?Justice La Forest reasoned that
[f] rom the general principle that a state has exclusive jurisdiction within
its own territory and that other states must under principles of comity

respect the exercise of its jurisdiction within its own territory, it seems
axiomatic to me that, at least as a general rule, the law to be applied in torts
63
is the law of the place where the activity occurred, i.e., the lex loci delicti.
The majority judgment ofJustice La Forest cites a number of "practical considerations" for the choice of the lex loci delictirule. First, he
argues that the rule "has the advantage of certainty, ease of application and predictability. 6 4 Second, he argues that the territorial
59J. Morris, 'The Proper Law of A Tort" (1951) 64 Harv. L. Rev. 881.
60

Part III of the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (U.K)

1995. For a discussion of the Law Commission work that informed the new
laws, see P. North, Essays in PrivateInternationalLaw (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1993), c. 461 Tolofson, supranote 1 at 1049.
62

Ibid.

63 Ibid. at 1049-50.
14

Ibid. at 1o5o.
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rule accords with normal expectations of people. Third, he invokes
the idea of international order in a world where no rule exists to
single out the appropriate jurisdiction:
If other states routinely applied their laws to activities taking place elsewhere, confusion would be the result. In our modern world of easy travel
and with the emergence of a global economic order, chaotic situations
would often result if the principle of territorial jurisdiction were not, at
least generally, respected. Stability of transactions and well grounded legal
expectations must be respected. Many activities within one state necessarily have impact in another, but a multiplicity of competing exercises of
state power in respect of such activities must be avoided.65
Although the lex loci delicti rule would ensure that Canadian
courts encouraged an orderly choice of law, the rule is controversial where many or all of the parties' connections, other than to
their physical location at the time of the accident, are to jurisdictions other than the place of the accident and where the laws of the
other relevant jurisdictions would lead to very different outcomes.
This was the situation in the Tolofson case itself, in which the plaintiff infant passenger and the defendant driver (and, in the background, the driver's insurer) were both from British Columbia.
Under the laws of Saskatchewan, which was the place of the accident, the plaintiff's claim would have been defeated by a guest
passenger statute and a limitations period provision on suits by
minors, while the same claim could have succeeded under the
laws of British Columbia. In the face of such arguments,Justice La
Forest maintained the importance of the lex loci delicti rule:
I remain unconvinced by these arguments. These "public policy" arguments simply mean that the court does not approve of the law that the
legislature having power to enact it within its territory has chosen to
adopt. These laws are usually enacted on the basis of what are often perceived by those who make them as reasonable, though they may turn out to
be unwise. The residents of the jurisdiction must put up with them until
they are modified, and one does not ordinarily ignore the law of the land
in favour of those who visit. True, it may be unfortunate for a plaintiff that
he or she was a victim of a tort in one jurisdiction rather than another and
so be unable to claim as much compensation as if it had occurred in
anotherjurisdiction. But such differences are a concomitant of the territoriality principle. While, no doubt, as was observed in Morguard,the underorder and fairness, order
lying principles of private international law are
66
comes first. Order is a precondition to justice.
65 Ibid. at 1o51.
66 Ibid. at

1O58.
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The majority invoked the idea of convergence in the underlying
laws of different jurisdictions as a reason why the emphasis on
order and certainty would not constitute significant injustice or
defeated expectations:
I should add that the "public policy" problems, particularly between the
provinces, tend to disappear over time. Ever since the launching of the
Tolofson case, Saskatchewan has repealed its guest passenger statute and
has changed the rule regarding the limitation period of minors. The
biggest difference between provinces now is in insurance
schemes, and this
67
only creates problems of quantum, not of liability.
Although such concerns would offer little comfort to the plaintiffs
in the particular case, it seems thatJustice La Forest and the court
were focused on the broader issues of international and federal
public policy.
PART 3: THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF CANADIAN PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW: Two CONTRASTING MODES
The tetralogy has much to say about the need for the internationalist reform of traditional rules, and one way to understand the
tetralogy is to view it as part of a process of the "internationalization" of Canadian private international law through the mechanisms of public international law. I will argue in the proceeding
text that values that are important in public international law
have much to do with the kinds of reforms and policyjustifications
made in the tetralogy. However, these values play an indirect role.
What the tetralogy is not is the traditional use of public international law processes - whether customary or conventional international law - to reform private international law. Instead, in
Canada, as in most non-European jurisdictions, private international law remains largely municipal in its sources and venues.
What the tetralogy does involve is the triumph of a substantive
vision and a set of policy objectives that are identifiably associated
with the goals of public international law.
INTERNATIONALIZATION THROUGH INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

International conventions have not traditionally been significant
sources of the rules of private international law in common law
jurisdictions, and the Supreme Court of Canada in the tetralogy
does not institute legal reform of specific rules because the court
67

Ibid. at 1059.
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believed reforms were necessitated by binding international treaty
commitments on the part of Canada. However, the decisions of the
court do draw on, parallel, and augment some limited reforms
instituted through the implementation of international conventions on related subjects.
Like most other common law jurisdictions, Canada has signed
few of the conventions developed through the Hague Conference
on Private International Law (Hague Conference) .68 The Hague
conventions to which Canada is a party, such as the Convention on
Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil
and Commercial Matters and the Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters, 69 concern matters of
minor practical importance compared with the reforms instituted
through the tetralogy. However, they can be viewed as precursors in
their approach to facilitating mutually beneficial objectives through
70
the use of cooperation among courts and diplomatic offices.
International treaties and institutions have had their greatest
impact in Canadian private international law with respect to
arbitration. In 1986, Canada signed the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York
Convention), which both eased procedures for, and limited
grounds for refusal of, the recognition and enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards. 71 Federal and provincial legislation subsequently
68 There are, in addition, the private international law provisions of specialized

conventions such as the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, October 12, 1929, 137 L.N.T.S. 13, Can.
T.S. 1947 No. 15, as amended by the Protocol to Amend the Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, September 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371, Can. T.S. 1964, No. 29.
19 Convention on Service Abroad ofJudicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil
and Commercial Matters, November 15, 1965, 658 U.N.T.S. 163; Convention
on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters, March 18,
197o, 847 U.N.T.S. 241. See generally, G. Droz, "AComment on the Role of the
Hague Conference on Private International Law" (1994) 57 Law and Contemp.
Probs. 3.
70 For a sense of this hopeful cosmopolitan and internationalist sentiment, see, for
example, T.M.C. Asser Institute, The Influence of the Hague Conference on Private
InternationalLaw: Selected Essays to Celebratethe zooth Anniversary of the Hague Conference on PrivateInternationalLaw (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993); Hague
Conference on Private International Law, Proceedings of the Seventeenth Session,
Tome s - Second Part, "Centenary" (La Haye: SDU Publishers, 1994-95).
71 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 1o, 1958, 330 U.N.TS. 38, Can. T.S. 1986 No. 43 [hereinafter New
York Convention]. See J.-G. Castel et al., eds., The CanadianLaw and Practice of
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implemented the New York Convention. 72 Canadian jurisdictions
have since implemented legislation based on the 1985 United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. 73 The Canadian reforms were part of a broader international movement towards
acceptance and promotion of international commercial arbitration. 74 The legislative acceptance of international commercial arbitration paralleled and, in important senses, anticipated the policy
outlook that the Supreme Court of Canada adopted in the tetralogy.
The nature of the reforms in the Canadian law related to international commercial arbitration and the policy justifications for
the reforms share many of the characteristics of the reforms
and policyjustifications in the tetralogy. The judicial acceptance of
similar values is in some sense unsurprising. No arbitration system
is self-executing. National courts are needed both to enforce arbi75
tration clauses and to recognize and enforce arbitral awards.
Although the Supreme Court of Canada has not issued ajudgment
concerning the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model
Law, lower courts in Canada have been very supportive of the
relevant legislation and the use of arbitration. For example, lower
courts have generally supported the arbitration legislation by staying court proceedings and enforcing arbitration clauses, restricting court interference with arbitration procedures, and limiting
the judicial review of arbitral awards made in Canadian jurisdictions and of foreign arbitral awards. 76 This approach contrasts
InternationalTrade with ParticularEmphasis on Export and Import of Goods and Services, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1997) at 724-25.

72 See J.B. Casey, Internationaland Domestic Commercial Arbitration (Scarborough,
ON: Carswell, 1992) (updated 1999), C.2, for a review of the federal and provincial legislation.
73 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, June 21, 1985, (1985) 24 I.L.M. 1302. For
commentary on relevant Canadian law and practice, see Castel et al., supra note
71 atc. 21.

71Dezalay and Garth, supranote 9, provide a sophisticated sociological analysis of
the establishment of international commercial arbitration in a number of differentjurisdictions.
75The failure to fully attend to the role of national courts is one of the principal
weaknesses of the account by Dezalay and Garth, supra note 9, of the establishment of the arbitration regime.
76For example, see the review of the legislative provisions and judicial interpretation related to international commercial arbitration in R. Pepper, "Why
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with the greater suspicion that traditionally characterized the common law attitude towards international commercial arbitration. In
Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. CanadianNational Railway Co. ,77
the Supreme Court of Canada, with Justice La Forest writing for the
court, reinstated a trial decision enforcing an arbitration clause,
adopting the reasons of a dissenting judge in the appellate court
who adopted the view that it was
the very strong public policy of this jurisdiction that where parties
have agreed by contract that they will have the arbitrators decide their
claims, instead
of resorting to Courts, the parties should be held to their
78
contract.

The fact that a similarly supportive stance towards international
conventions and implementing legislation in private international
law would probably have been adopted by the Supreme Court of
Canada is demonstrated by its approach to the Convention on the
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (Child Abduction
Convention) .79 In Thomson v. Thomson,s ° a majority of the court
interpreted the laws of Manitoba that implemented the Child
Abduction Convention and held that a court deciding on the
return of a child should not simply consider the best interests of the
particular child as it would in a domestic custody hearing.8 1 The
majority also indicated that it would consider that an application
for the return of a child under the convention would pre-empt a
local custody application - in this case, a transitory order giving

Arbitrate?: Ontario's Recent Experience with Commercial Arbitration" (1998)
36 Osgoode Hall L.J. 807; Castel et al., supra note 71 at c. 21; Quintette Coal Ltd.
v. Nippon Steel Corp., [1991] 1 W.W.R. 219 (B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C.
refused [199o] 2 S.C.R. x.
77 Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Canadian National Railway Co., [1997] 1
S.C.R. 5.
78 Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. CanadianNationalRailway (1995), 7 B.C.L.R.
( 3 d) 8o at 94 (B.C.C.A.), quoting from Boart Weden AB v. NYA Stomnes AB
(1988), 41 B.L.R. 295 at 302-03 (Ont. H.C.).
79 Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, October 25,
198o, Can. T.S. 1983 No. 35. This convention was also considered in W(V) v.
S.(D.), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 1o8; and brieflyin Gordonv. Goertz, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27 at
76-77, L'Heureux-Dubi J.
80 Thomson v. Thomson, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 551 at 578-8o, La ForestJ. [hereinafter
Thomson]. For commentary, see V. Black and C.Jones, Case Comment (1994) 12
C.F.L.Q. 321.
SI Justices Claire L'Heureux-Dub6 and Beverley McLachlin dissented on this point.
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the mother interim custody while she proceeded with a custody
application in Scotland. Rather, the court used its remedial flexibility to advance the -'purpose and spirit" of the Child Abduction Convention by ordering the return of the child to Scotland
from Canada under an undertaking from the Scottish father to
commence custody proceedings expeditiously before a Scottish
court and not to take physical custody of the child until a Scottish
court permitted such custody.82
The New York Convention, the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, and other important conventions on private international law that have been reached among
various European jurisdictions, 3 as well as the Hague conventions,
suggest to some commentators that private international law is
shifting from development and reform focused on state courts to
reform negotiated through international conventions and implemented through state legislation. The most recent effort for the
internationalization of private international law through international conventions is the negotiation under the auspices of the
Hague Conference to reach a multilateral convention on recognition and enforcement of judgments.8 4 Unlike the earlier Hague
conventions, this treaty would cover a core topic of private international law. However, a number of barriers exist to the successful
completion of such a convention. 85 Furthermore, it is quite likely
82

Thomson, supranote 8o at 6o 5 , La ForestJ.

85

Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and

Commercial Matters, September 27, 1968, 1262 U.N.T.S. 1653 [hereinafter
Brussels Convention]; Convention onJurisdiction and the Enforcement ofJudgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, September 16, 1988, 1659 U.N.T.S. 13
[hereinafter Lugano Convention]; Convention on the Law Applicable to
Contractual Obligations, June 19, 198o, 1605 U.N.T.S. 59 [hereinafter Rome
Convention].
s For a useful discussion of the Hague Conference on Private International Law
negotiations concerning a treaty for recognition and enforcement ofjudgments,
see "Symposium Enforcing Judgments Abroad: The Global Challenge" (1998)
24 BrooklynJ. Int'l L. 1; A. von Mehren, "Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: A New Approach For the Hague Conference?" (1994) 57 Law
and Contemp. Probs. 271.
81 V. Black, "Commodifying Justice for Global Free Trade: The Proposed Hague
Judgments Convention" (2000) 38 Osgoode Hall L. J. 267. The Preliminary
Draft Convention onJurisdiction and ForeignJudgments in Civil and Commercial Matters was adopted by the Special Commission of the Hague Conference
on October 30, 1999; text can be found online at <http://www.hcch.net/e/
conventions/draft36e.html> (last modified: October 30, 1999).

Annuaire canadien de Droit international2 001
that any such convention will include substantial room for variation with respect to municipal rules among different signatories.8 6
In addition to the practical difficulties of negotiating new international conventions, some further limits on the use of public
international law as a mode for reform in private international law
are demonstrated by the somewhat undisciplined use of international law materials by the Supreme Court of Canada in the tetralogy. The court's judgments frequently refer to international and
comparative materials. For example, Justice La Forest's judgment
in Morguard contrasted Canadian rules on recognition and enforcement with developments under the European conventions on
recognition and enforcement of judgments. 87 One reading might
be that the Canadian courts are engaged in a process of harmonization through dialogue with foreign and international legal systems 8 and incorporation of international law norms into Canadian
law. However, as Stephen Toope has observed, the court has not
developed a clear understanding of its use of either international
conventions or customary international law.9 At the same time, the
court repeatedly invokes international materials as useful supports
for interpreting and developing Canadian law. Such engagement
with international materials permits some harmonization of rules,
where the court feels inclined in that direction, but not where it
disagrees with, or is uninformed about, customary or conventional
international law. A lack of clarity with respect to the use of customary and conventional international law may partly be related
to an effort by Canadian courts to bracket contentious issues of federalism, such as the status of the treaty implementation power,
which is an issue to which I will return later in this article. For the
86 R. Weintraub, "How Substantial Is Our Need for aJudgments-Recognition Con-

vention and What Should We Bargain Away to Get It?" (1998)
Int'l
L. 167.
87 Morguard,supra note i at o98 and 11 oo.
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88 See, for example, A. Bayefsky, InternationalHuman Rights Law: Use in Canadian
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Charterof Rights and Freedoms Litigation (Toronto: Butterworths, 1992); A.-M.
Slaughter, "A Typology of Transjudicial Communication" (1994) 29 U. Richmond L. Rev. 99. The judges of the court frequently discuss this subject in
speeches and articles; for example, La Forest, supra note 41; G.V. La Forest, 'The
Expanding Role of the Supreme Court of Canada in International Law Issues"
(1996) 34 Can. YB. Int'l L. 89 at 97-1oo. Given the limited range of "appropriate" topics for judicial speeches, the prominence of this subject is suggestive of
the consensus behind internationalism in Canada.
S. Toope, "Canada and International Law," in The Impact ofInternationalLaw on
the Practiceof Law in Canada(The Hague: Kluwer, 1999) 33 at 34-38.
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purposes of this section, however, the undisciplined approach of
Canadian courts to the use of international law sources supports
the view that internationalization in private international law has
not been primarily a matter of formally binding international law
but, instead, more a matter of courts accepting and promoting
internationalist policy values. This is reform through the mode of
internationalist "consciousness."
INTERNATIONALIZATION BY INTERNATIONALIST "CONSCIOUSNESS"

The tetralogy evidences another, arguably more important, mode
of internationalization of Canadian private international law an internationalization of the "consciousness" of Canadian legal
decision-makers at the level of overall approach and policy orientation. 90 Law operates as a link between norms and material consequences in various state apparatuses. In this sense, the tetralogy
demonstrates the importance of "internationalism" as a set of
beliefs that can have material effects both at the international level
and at the municipal level. The judgments in the tetralogy repeatedly refer to the need to update traditional rules to meet the
demands of contemporary international society.9 1
I believe that the tetralogy evidences a particular set of policy
goals associated with internationalism. The facilitation of international commerce, the emphasis on comity and cooperation among
state systems and courts, and the invocations against parochialism
echo economic, political, and moral arguments familiar from other
kinds of policy discourses concerning international relations and
international society. In particular, I argue that significant characteristics of the policy vision found in the tetralogy track the
economic, political, and moral aspirations of traditions of liberal
internationalism. Focusing on the policy discussion in these four
judgments offers an unusually salient opportunity to explore the
different policy planks of liberal internationalist policy argumentation in law.
Even if the trend towards formal internationalization continues,
I believe that a focus on internationalist policy consciousness in

10For

a related analysis, see H. Arthurs, "Globalization of the Mind: Canadian

Elites and the Restructuring of Legal Fields" (1998) 12 Can. J. Law and Soc.
219.

91 This trope of reform is a constant in international law; see D. Kennedy, "A New
World Order: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow" (1994) 4 Transnat'l L. and Contemp. Probs. 329.
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private international law is useful. This utility is partially due to the
fact that the courts will continue to play a large role in addressing
the many legal issues not subject to international conventions or
national legislation.9 2 In addition, the interpretation of treaties and
legislation and the application of provisions to particular disputes
is often not a mechanical exercise but rather a creative process that
involves courts inevitably in policy analysis. Moreover, the legislators, negotiators, academics, and policymakers who formulate,
negotiate, and implement international conventions in this area
share many of the same conceptions of the international that
were articulated by the court in the tetralogy. A critical assessment
of these policy justifications should therefore be useful to legal
actors involved in the internationalization trend, regardless of
whether law reform in private international law remains in the
hands of municipal courts or becomes the subject of international
agreements.
IntellectualContexts
Since law is both a material and ideational social phenomenon,
the role of general ideas, outlooks, and sentiments in generating
particular legal regimes is obvious. Precise connections are very
difficult to track. One approach is to look towards a shared legal
"consciousness" of a particular group or society at a particular
time.9 3 Something like a common "vision" or "'sentiment" concerning the international system can be shared by a number of different
legal actors in a legal system, including judges, diplomats, bureaucrats, legislators, practitioners, and business actors.
Other accounts utilize the idea of legal "cultures" to illuminate the
94
importance of background norms and beliefs in international law.
92 The current situation in Britain is a good example of the continuing relevance of
both traditions - international and municipal. One instance of the tensions
generated by efforts to incorporate international conventions into a traditional
common law subject are recent editions of the leading UK treatise; L. Collins,
ed., Dicey & Morrison the Conflict of Laws, 12th ed. (London: Sweet and Maxwell,
1993) [hereinafter Dicey & Morris]. On this tension, see R. Wai, "Book Review
of Dicey & Morris on the Conflict of Laws, edited by L. Collins" (1997) 8 Eur.J. Int'l
L. 386.
91 See, for example, D. Kennedy, 'Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal
Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 185o-1940"
(1980) 3 Research in Law and Society.
94 See, for example, 0. Korhonen, InternationalLaw Situated:An Analysis of the Lawyer's Stancetowards Culture,History and Community (The Hague: Kluwer, 2000), c. 2.
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Some of this scholarship has emphasized that to understand why
arguments about internationalist reform have such a ready audience one must have an understanding of the international law elite
as sharing a disciplinary "culture," which disposes them towards a
fundamental, basic commitment to "the simple idea that things go
better when they go internationally."9' 5 Some recent work in international law, for example, has turned towards the biographical and
professional class characteristics of legal decision-makers in order
to illuminate some overlooked aspects of the discipline.96 This
approach to international law seems appropriate because so many
of its leading figures have similar backgrounds and similar values.
Indeed, public international lawyers have been famously described
by Oscar Schachter as an "invisible college" whose members share
97
certain subject interests and outlooks.
Other scholarship traces the connections of the belief systems
of international lawyers to the more general intellectual and cultural currents of their time. 98 An illustrative study that explores the
ideas of disciplinary and broader cultures of internationalism is the
9 D. Kennedy, "The Disciplines of International Law and Policy" (1999)
J. Int'l L. 9 at 23.
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Leiden

96 See, for example, 'The Academic as Cosmopolite: Legal Visions of International
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Governance in the Twentieth Century," in On Violence, Money, Power and Culture:
Reviewing the InternationalistLegacy: Proceedings of the 9 3 1 Annual Meeting (Washington DC: American Society of International Law, 2000), 325-31. In previous
work, I attempted to provide some focus for this important aspect of international law by tracking the influence of the policy vision of the international system in the work and background ofJustice La Forest, the leadingjudge on international law matters at the Supreme Court of Canada; Wai, supranote 6. Justice
La Forest was the leading figure in the tetralogy as well. He wrote the majority
judgment in three of the cases and was on the panel of five that decided the
fourth. In the Amchem caseJustice Sopinka identifies his judgment as being consistent with the judgment and approach in Morguard; and in the later Hunt and
Tolofsonjudgments, Justice La Forest in turn interprets the judgment in Amchem
to be consistent with, and indeed an integrated component of, his vision for private international law in Canada.
0. Schachter, "The Invisible College of International Lawyers" (1977) 72 Northwestern U. L. Rev. 217.

98 Nathaniel Berman pioneered this approach in his studies of the connections

between the international law of the inter-war period and concurrent ideas of
modernism in culture and politics. See, for example, N. Berman, "Modernism,
Nationalism, and the Rhetoric of Reconstruction" (1992) 4 Yale J. L. and
Humanities 351; N. Berman, "'But the Alternative is Despair': European
Nationalism and the Modernist Renewal of International Law" (1993) io6

Harv. L. Rev.
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recent study of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht by Martti Koskenniemi. 99
Koskenniemi describes Lauterpacht's disciplinary efforts in international law as originating in a nineteenth-century "Victorian tradition," with "its liberal rationalism and its ideal of the rule of
law, its belief in progress, its certainty about the sense and direction
of history,'100 and coming "to rest in a pragmatism of the 196os, a
pragmatism which by now may have spent whatever creative force it
once had."101 Koskenniemi's study demonstrates how the biographical and national contexts of Lauterpacht's position as ajew in Austria help to explain Lauterpacht's "assimilation" strategy of support
10 2
for the Victorian tradition and for legal cosmopolitanism.
In what follows, I try to elaborate on some of the disciplinary and
national contexts for the internationalism of the Supreme Court of
Canada's judgments in private international law. I will then focus
on how the judgments rely on a contemporary version of an internationalist vision that is a manifestation of the "liberal rationalism"
that Koskenniemi attributes to Lauterpacht and to an important
strand of the discipline of public international law.
InternationalistConsciousness and the Cosmopolitan Style
in InternationalLaw
In order to understand the policy vision of the international that
was advanced in the tetralogy, it seems useful to explore the strong
affinities of the internationalist values contained in the judgments
with the belief-systems of a group of "cosmopolitan" post-Second
World War public international lawyers. The Supreme Court of
Canada's approach to the international system in many ways seems
more familiar to public international lawyers than private international lawyers. Was the tetralogy, in effect, a diffuse conquest of private international law by the values, if not the processes, of public
international law?
Recent analyses observe that many public international lawyers
define their role to be part of a "project" of building international
order through international law. Most international lawyers are
engaged and committed to the project of expanding the domain of
9 M. Koskenniemi, "Lauterpacht: The Victorian Tradition in International Law"
('997) 8 EuropeanJ. Int'l L. 215.
ooIbid. at 2 16.
101 Ibid.
102

at 262.
Ibid. at 228-33.
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international law and institutions against the disorder of realpolitik
and narrow national interests. 103 For this group, international law
and institutions are without question better than a world of conflict
and anarchy. Especially in the twentieth century, this grouping
of international lawyers and policymakers have seen their role as an
attempt to minimize the possibility of the descent of the anarchic
international system into war and economic depression. International lawyers, no doubt, have understood the importance of sovereignty and national polities. From the perspective of maintaining
a peaceful international order, however, the problem has never
seemed to be excessive constraint of national sovereignty by international law and institutions.
The focus on the idea of a single set of values shared by international lawyers can obscure the fact that there are different
approaches to the achievement of international law and order. A
useful map for understanding the tetralogy is suggested by David
Kennedy's analysis of the "international style" in post-Second World
War law and policy. Kennedy considers that the post-Second World
War debate on international law and policy has involved two distinct "styles," each committed to building the international order
10 4
and to countering state sovereignty, but with different emphases.
On the one hand, "'metropolitans" favour supranational institutional remedies modelled on those of the traditional nation-state,
whether through the reassertion or revival of domestic institutions
or, more likely, through the construction of parallel structures regulatory boards, administrators, technocracies, courts - at the
international level. On the other hand, "cosmopolitans" are less
concerned with looking for such "traditional" institutional remedies and, instead, believe that international order and objectives
can be achieved through the operation of a diffuse regime of policymakers with a shared internationalist policy outlook. As Kennedy
observes ofJohn Jackson, a leading US international trade lawyer,
the concern of cosmopolitans was less with the establishment of
strong international-level institutions and more with the goal of a
"'widespread and vigorous liberal spirit."105
The variation in styles does not affect the basic commitment of
both cosmopolitans and metropolitans to the general idea that
10 Kennedy, supra note 95.
104

D. Kennedy, 'The International Style in Postwar Law and Policy" (1994) Utah

L. Rev. 7 at 28o Ibid. at 13.
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there should be an "internationalist" solution that advances international-level goals. Such a commitment to the building of international institutions and international law can blind internationalists
to some of the concomitant dangers of their solutions and marginalize certain types of alternative policies. The consequence is that
for both cosmopolitans and metropolitans, "the sense of having
rejected or replaced sovereignty works, perhaps ironically, to insu16
late the text from actual political conflict.
The tetralogy of the Supreme Court of Canada demonstrates
well the way in which a national court could effect internationalist
reform through "cosmopolitan" means. This kind of reform shows
how an internationalist-minded set of national legislators, bureaucrats, andjudges worldwide could effect reform that would forward
internationalist objectives through a "widespread and vigorous lib10 7
eral spirit."
A more metropolitan strand in private international law is
perhaps best represented by the reform work of the Hague Conference. The conference is a good example of the eclectic mix of
individuals that populate the world of policymaking in the field
of private international law. The conference demonstrates a common culture of international lawyers and scholars, with similar backgrounds, training, and interests, but committed to the development
of international treaties in the field of private international law.
The conference has drafted numerous draft conventions, although
few have significant numbers of signatories. 10 8 Currently, the Hague
Conference is the negotiating venue for efforts to reach an international convention on recognition and enforcement ofjudgments. 10 9
In this process, the Hague Conference has itself been changing as
it becomes subject to the hard-nosed world of trade law diplomacy
and commercial interest bargaining. 110
Metropolitan international law strategies such as the treaties of
the Hague Conference have, so far, had limited impact on actual
106

Ibid. at

29.

107 Ibid. at 13.

0 The only two conventions related to commercial matters that have been widely
accepted concern relatively minor subjects: see discussion in note 69.
109 See von Mehren, supra note 84.
110 Black, supra note 85, observes that representation at these meetings is shifting

from the grand old men of private international law to international trade
diplomats. The latter may be more interested in the give-and-take of international negotiations than the search for common principles or issues ofjustice of
older unification projects.
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national rules of private international law. Much more important
to internationalist reform have been the decisions of particular
national courts. The private international law judgments of the
Supreme Court of Canada fit well into the mode of the cosmopolitan internationalist national lawmaker, attempting to promote
international values even in the absence of an international legal
architecture. Unlike in fields such as public international law or
international trade law, it is the courts that have been the most
significant source of reform in Canadian private international law.
In this sense, the tetralogy provides stronger examples of legal
activism in the name of the international than the work of most
public international law judges or scholars, as these municipal
judges are law-makers in a way that most public international
lawyers are not. The private international law context also demonstrates how a decentralized process of reform can lead to similar
results across jurisdictions because of the prevalence of certain
types of policy arguments in the mindset of key decision-makers a kind of harmonization by shared vision and spirit.
What does this cosmopolitan spirit consist of? It continues to
identify nationalism and statism as the values that pose the most
serious threats of disorder.11' In particular, the internationalist
professional and disciplinary class often views itself as fighting
tendencies within domestic governments and populations towards
parochialism and narrow self-interest. 12 A lapse into parochialism
jeopardizes mutually beneficial cooperation and public goods,
including the benefits of international peace and a functioning
international economy. The nightmare scenarios for the discipline
of international lawyers are those of the interwar period, in which
increasing militarism led to constant violent conflicts and eventually to world war, and economic nationalism led to the complete
collapse of the trading system and economic depression. Avoiding
such downward spirals is the key concern of cosmopolitan internationalists in public international law. In the tetralogy, we see the
spread of these sentiments into a realm of law more removed from
high politics.
One general danger of adopting the goals of public international
law in private international law is that private international lawyers
and most national judges hearing disputes in private international
See, for example, T. Franck, "Clan and Superclan: Loyalty, Identity and Community in Law and Practice" (1996) 90 Am.J. Int'l L. 359.
112 Kennedy, supra note 95.
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law are not experts in the challenges of international conflicts and
negotiations of state interests. Although gently cosmopolitan, private international lawyers and judges focus more specifically on
rules justified by "lower" level concerns, such as fairness to the parties and the development of a workable scheme for domestic courts,
rather than large-scale state concerns, such as peace and interstate
trade. Few private international scholars and judges are familiar
with the experience of public international lawyers or governmental officials engaged in security negotiations. Nor are they typically
familiar with the hard-bargaining and unhappy compromises of
trade law practitioners or negotiators. Many private international
lawyers and judges have experienced the international as a realm
of peaceful cooperation, economic exchange, cosmopolitan education, and multinational values. Ironically, this perspective may prepare the way for an uncritical embrace of internationalist values.
Such an uncritical reception of internationalism is a particular
danger in the Canadian context.
CanadianLegalInternationalismand CanadianInternationalLegalism
The importance of traditions of internationalism and multilateralism in Canadian policymaking and identity-formation is also relevant to Canadian legal institutions and legal values. Contemporary
Canadian lawmakers, including the judges of the tetralogy at the
Supreme Court of Canada, operate in a national context that is
marked by a commitment to internationalism and multilateralism.
National context matters to internationalism. In the United States,
international lawyers and cosmopolitan liberals, more generally,
while being crucial in defining the academic discipline of international law, are largely marginal players in the mainstream of US
politics and law-making.113 In contrast, what was marginal in the
United States has, especially in the post-Second World War period,
become more the mainstream in Canada. Internationalist policy
argumentation is much more positively received in Canada. Indeed,
I will argue that this more favourable view of the international
lapses, at times, into a naively simple support for the international.
Foreign and international elements are pervasive in Canadian
law. 1 4 The imperial and commonwealth legacy remains very strong.
Ibid. at 17-29.

1
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For a critical commentary on the sociology of a legal profession that has diminished ties to Canada, see Arthurs, supra note 9 o .
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The availability of appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council from the Supreme Court of Canada was not formally discontinued until 1949.115 More importantly, recourse by Canadian
courts, lawyers, and scholars to British and Commonwealth court
decisions and scholarly writings has continued to this day. Canadian law schools include an unusual amount of foreign materials
in their teaching, and many Canadian legal academics are immigrants from Britain or other Commonwealth jurisdictions or are
16
Canadians who have studied or worked abroad.
A number of the judges of the Supreme Court of Canada have
international experience through study or work abroad. Justice La
Forest, the leading judge in the tetralogy, was raised in a bilingual,
bicultural environment, completed graduate work at Oxford and
Yale, 1 7 and was the author of the leading Canadian treatise on
extradition."' Justice Frank Iacobucci did graduate work in England and worked in private practice in New York. Justice Louise
Arbour, recently appointed to the court, was the former chief prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia." 9 The Canadian judges participate actively in the
l
116

See P. Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw of Canada,4 th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at
section 8.2.
For example, fourteen of the fifty-two full-time faculty at Osgoode Hall Law
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School in Toronto in the 1997-98 academic year received their legal training
entirely outside of Canada. These included Peter Hogg, the current dean of the
school and the author of the leading treatise on Canadian constitutional law,
who is originally from New Zealand and was educated there and in Australia. In
addition, forty-five of the fifty-two full-time faculty had at least one university
degree from a non-Canadian university; OsgoodeHall Law School of York University
1997-1998 Calendarat11-12.
See, generally, Johnson and McEvoy, supranote 6.

118

G.V. La Forest, Extradition to and from Canada (New Orleans: Hauser Press,

1961). The most recent edition is edited by Anne Warner La Forest, La Forest's
Extradition to andfrom Canada,3rd ed. (Aurora, ON: Canada Law Books, 1991).
Justice La Forest was the leading authority at the court on extradition, and he
wrote the court's judgments in a series of significant extradition cases; for
example, Canada v. Schmidt, [19871 1 S.C.R. 500; McVey (Re); McVey v. United
States, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 475; Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1991] 2
S.C.R. 779 [hereinafter Kindler]; Reference Re Ng Extradition (Can.), [ 199 ] 2
S.C.R. 858 [hereinafter Re Ng Extradition]. These cases offer an interesting
parallel to the private international law judgments; see Wai, supra note 6.
119 It is interesting to note the change injustice Louise Arbour's approach to international matters as she moved from being a leading judge of Canadian criminal law to being the chief prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia. As a domestic judge, Justice Arbour was a strong
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formal and informal networks among courts and lawyers, which
one commentator has variously labelled "transjudicial dialogue,"
"transgovernmentalism," and 'Judicial foreign policy. '120 The
judges travel frequently and meet with judicial counterparts from
121
other jurisdictions.
This personal experience of the judges of the Supreme Court
of Canada may contribute to internationalist trends in the court's
judgments. At the level of sources, for example, Canadian courts
now regularly cite US materials 22 and frequently discuss provisions of international law,1 23 although in a fashion that is at times
haphazard. 24 The tetralogy is filled with references to foreign and
international materials. For example, the judgment in Morguard
invokes the examples of the "full faith and credit" provisions in the
United States and Australia constitutions, the European conventions on the recognition and enforcement of judgments, and the
doctrine of comity in the United States.1 25 Thejudgment in Amchem
defender of the rights of the accused. For example, in the decision of the
Ontario Court of Appeal in R v. Finta (1992), 92 D.L.R. 4 th i, she sided with a
three-justice majority, which acquitted the accused war criminal. The failure of
the appeal of thatjudgment at a deeply divided Supreme Court of Canada effectively emasculated Canadian domestic prosecution of accused war criminals
from the Second World War; P, v. Finta,[1994] 1 S.C.R. 70 1. As chief prosecutor, the much less settled terrain of the war crimes prosecutions led to her development and advocacy of tools such as sealed indictments that it seems unlikely
she would have accepted in a domestic context. Her return to Canada in 1999
as a member of the Supreme Court of Canada may see the pendulum switch
back, as she may become a leading figure in a return to emphasis on underlying
domestic values. For example, the Supreme Court of Canada effectively overruled KindlerandReNgExtradition,supranote 118, in finding that the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms did not permit extradition of Canadian suspects to a USjurisdiction without assurances that they would not face the death
penalty; United Statesv. Burns, [2ooi] 1 S.C.R. 283. This is a dramatic change
and reflects a quite different conception of international criminal matters than
that which the court, underJustice La Forest's lead, had been pursuingjust one
decade earlier; see Wai, supra note 6; E. Morgan, "In the Penal Colony: Internationalism and the Canadian Constitution" (1999) 49 U.T.L.J. 447.
121 See A.-M. Slaughter, 'The Real New World Order" (1997) 76 Foreign Affairs
183 at 186-89. See also Slaughter, supra note 88.
121 Slaughter, supra note 12 o at 188-89.
122 G.V. La Forest, 'The Use of American Precedent in Canadian Courts" (1994)

46 Maine L. Rev.
123

21 1.

See, for example, Bayefsky, supranote 88; La Forest, supra note 41.

121 See Toope, supra note 89.
1215Morguard,supranote 1 at 1o96,

'o98, and s 1oo.
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cites and discusses the important House of Lords decisions with
21 6
respect to both .forum non conveniens and anti-suit injunctions.
27
In contrast, even the most internationalist of US decisions rarely
cite, let alone seriously consider, international or comparative
materials. The parochialism of US courts with respect to foreign
and international law has been the source of comment both outside 128 and within the United States.

29

The tetralogy and other international law decisions of the
Supreme Court of Canada may simply reflect the significant traditions of internationalism in general Canadian policy discourse.
This notion is partly due to the political and economic reality of a
small national economy, which was formerly part of larger empires
and more recently is highly integrated into the international economy, particularly with the United States.2 0 Canadian political and
cultural identities have also been bound up with foreign and international matters because of significant and continuing migration.
As a consequence of immigration and Canadian policies of multiculturalism, many Canadians retain strong identifications with
other national cultures. 13' Canadian foreign policy has involved
a significant focus on multilateralism, with a strongly favourable
view of international organizations and law as a place for Canada to
play a "middle power" role. 2 2 In international law, Canadian legal
126 Amchem, supra note

i at 922-25.

127For example, the decision of the US Supreme Court in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler-ChryslerPlymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 61 4 (1985) [hereinafter Mitsubishi Motors].
128 See La Forest, supranote 122 at 218-2o.

129See H. Blackmun, 'The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations" (1994) 104
Yale L.J. 39. For a critique of the common perception that US courts are xenophobic, see K. Clermont and T. Eisenberg, "Commentary: Xenophilia in American Courts" (1996) 109 Harv. L. Rev. 112o.
130See, for example, H. Innis, TheFur Tradein Canada (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1930); H. Innis, Essays in CanadianEconomic History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1956); R. Naylor, Canada in the European Age 1453-1919
(Vancouver: New Star Books, 1987); KR. Nossal, The Politics of CanadianForeign
Policy, 3 d ed., (Scarborough, ON: Prentice Hall, 1997) at 29-3 1.
131See J. Holmes, The Better Part of Valour: Essays on CanadianDiplomacy (Toronto:
McClelland and Stewart, 1970); for a skeptical view, see Nossal, supra note 130
at 57.
112See, for example, W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1995); C. Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition," inA. Gutmann, ed., Multiculturalism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994); C. Taylor, Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on CanadianFederalism and Nationalism (Montreal:
McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993).
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academics have been significant advocates of multilateralism and
the international cooperative approach. 13 David Kennedy's description of international lawyers in the difficult climate of the postSecond World War United States seems even more appropriate
with respect to Canadian international lawyers:
[L] egal internationalists in the United States tend to be humanist and liberal in the European sense; overwhelmingly committed to the idea that
international law is a good thing, both inevitable and worth working quite
hard for even against formidable odds. Their most significant disciplinary
commitment is less to the politics of American liberalism than to the single
idea that things go better when they go internationally."'
The strong traditions of internationalism in Canadian legal culture and in the policy community more generally do not automatically translate into internationalist legal reforms. It may be that
on international matters, as in other areas, the Canadian courts
operate at a lag to other Canadian institutions and to changes in
Canadian social values. In Morguard, the court itself invoked this
sense of law being at a lag to internationalizing tendencies in the
broader society in order to bolster the case for the legal reforms
undertaken in the judgment.
Hence, in the tetralogy, the court may simply be reflecting more
general Canadian social values. However, courts also sometimes
move in advance of broader opinion and can play a role in shaping
policies and attitudes. Arguably, the Supreme Court of Canada
judgments in private international law are an example of a court
playing a leading role in constituting an internationalist system in
both rules and values. In this role, the court can be compared to the
role of the European Court ofJustice in promoting the process of
European integration.135 The Supreme Court of Canada's role in
promoting internationalist reform is perhaps more unexpected in
that this was a national court rather than an international court.
133 See, for example, R. St.J. Macdonald, G. Morris, and D.Johnston, "Canadian

Approaches to International Law," in R. St. J. Macdonald, G. Morris, and
D. Johnston, eds., CanadianPerspectives on InternationalLaw and Organization
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974) 940 at 950-54. Canadian lawyers have been prominent in international institutions; for example, John
Humphrey's role in the first years of the United Nations. More recently, Canadians have figured prominently in the operation of the war crimes tribunals for
Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia; see, for example, P. Knox, "Canadian Key
Players at Hague Tribunal," Globe and Mail (July 17, 2001 ), Ai o.
134 Kennedy, supranote 95 at 23.
135

See, for example, Weiler, supranote 6.
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No doubt, the Supreme Court of Canada in the tetralogy was both
reflecting and deploying an internationalist vision in a national
and disciplinary context in which these values already had some
resonance. In doing so, the court instituted national legal reform
by deploying a powerful, but a particular, internationalist vision.
In addition to many benefits thereby achieved, there are clearly
dangers in this mode of internationalization. Specifically, reform
in the name of the international can fail to acknowledge that there
are many internationalist goals and visions. Being for the international, even in Canada, should not be a simple matter.
PART

4: THE

STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONALIST POLICY

ARGUMENTATION IN THE TETRALOGY

The previous section explained the modes of internationalism
that were operating in the tetralogy of private international law
cases of the Supreme Court of Canada. The following section
describes in more detail the content of the particular internationalist visions advanced in the tetralogy. In the "cosmopolitan" internationalization in private international law, common structures of
policy argumentation are more important than whether a decisionmaker points to binding international law treaties or institutions to
explain their decisions. While imperfectly articulated sentiments
towards the international might form the bulk of internationalism
in "a vigorously liberal spirit,1 36 I believe that this internationalist
"spirit" can be described with somewhat more precision as involving a policy commitment towards some basic international values.
Ultimately, these policy commitments may involve many indeterminacies and irrationalities, but they also provide the language and
structure for the recognition and analysis of such indeterminacies
and irrationalities.
STRUCTURES OF POLICY ARGUMENT

The policy argumentation behind the internationalist reform
in the tetralogy powerfully invokes a set of political, economic,
and moral arguments for an internationalist order. I believe that
the policy concerns identified are associated with liberal internationalism and, in particular, policies related to international com137
merce, international cooperation, and cosmopolitan fairness.
136 Kennedy,
137

supra note 104 at

13.

Each of these policy objectives is discussed in detail in R. Wai, Commerce, Cooperation, Cosmopolitanism: PrivateInternationalLaw and the Public Policy Structure of
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When combined, these policy concerns provide reinforcing justifications for particular legal reforms. They have special pull when
the argumentation is deployed in contexts such as a cosmopolitan
disciplinary consciousness or an internationalist national tradition
such as those already described.
These types of policy justification for internationalist reforms
have a heritage. All three can be traced back to the traditions of
liberal internationalism and can be found in the work of liberal
theorists such as John Stuart Mill and Immanuel Kant. 138 Liberal
internationalist theorists have generated a system of reasoning about
political and economic interests in which ideals of non-intervention
and cooperative interaction achieved an underlying normative harmony of interests. At the political level, the ideal of non-intervention,
perhaps backed up by either international institutions or the policies of powerful states, provides a means for sovereign states to
achieve peace119 In the international economy, the ideal of a liberalized trading order replaced the mercantilist idea of conflict over
a fixed set of economic goods with the liberal ideal of cooperative
gains in worldwide production through international exchange and
specialization based on principles of comparative advantage. 4 ,
Even imperial relations were understood through the lens of a
potential harmony of interests, although rife with problematic
claims about the "needs" of barbarian peoples for the political, economic, and moral resources and guidance of the West.141 Informing
Internationalism(S.J.D. dissertation, Harvard Law School, 2000) (on file at Harvard Law School Library).
1I8 Itrack these arguments in John Stuart Mill's theories of international politics,
international economics, and empire in R. Wai,John StuartMill andInternational
Relations (M.Phil. thesis, Oxford University, 199o) [unpublished]. On liberal
traditions of international relations and law, see A.-M. Slaughter, "International
Law in a World of Liberal States" (1995) 6 EuropeanJ. Int'l L. 5o3; T.Nardin
and D. Mapel, Traditionsof InternationalEthics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), chapters 7, 8, io,and 12.
139 See, for example, J.S. Mill, "A Few Words on Non-Intervention" (1859) in J.M.

Robson, ed., Collected Works ofJohn Stuart Mill (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1963-91), vol. XXI, Essays on Law, Equality, and Education, 1o9.
140 See, for example, J.S. Mill, The Principles of PoliticalEconomy, 7th ed. (London:
1I

Longmans, Green and Company, 1909), Book III, chapters 17 and 18.
See, for example, J.S. Mill, Considerationson Representative Government (1861)
chapter XVIII ("Of the Government of Dependencies by a Free State"), in Robson, supra note 139, vol. XIX, Essays on Politicsand Society;J.S. Mill, "Wakefield's
The New British Province of South Australia," in Robson, supra note 139, vol.
XXII, NewspaperWritings, 738;J.S. Mill, "England and Ireland," in Robson, supra
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all of these concerns was a moral cosmopolitanism linked to a
liberal individualism, which prioritized the rights or at least the
interests of the individual over claims of nation, community, or the
collective.

142

As discussed earlier in this article, these liberal internationalist
values of international commerce, cooperation, and cosmopolitanism have deep foundations in the discipline of public international
law. Joseph Weiler observes that similar objectives of "prosperity,
peace and supranationalism" were at work as "foundational ideals"
in the building of the European Union. 43 For a Europe devastated
by the political and economic catastrophes of the world wars, European integration was oriented towards the basic ideals of peace and
prosperity. As to "'supranationalism," Weiler means less a commitment to any particular institutional structure and more a sense,
consistent with Enlightenment liberalism, in which the treatment
44
of individuals would not depend on their state citizenship. 1
CHARACTERIZING INTERNATIONALIST REFORM: COMMON FEATURES
OF INTERNATIONALIST REFORM

Although each of the doctrinal reforms in the tetralogy has
distinctive features, some common characteristics do emerge. The
connections between these doctrinal reforms have been observed
by both supporters and critics. 145 At least four common characteristics of the reforms can be identified: an emphasis on greater
certainty and predictability in rules (certainty), the promotion of

142

note 39, vol. VI, Essays on England,Ireland, and theEmpire,505; Mill, supranote
14 o, Book II, c. 13.
The state or community instead is justified as instrumental to the interests
or rights of individuals, rather than as an end in itself; see Wai, supra note 138
atc. 1.

J. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1999) at 238-46.
144 Ibid. at 2 5 2.
J

145

See, for example, JJ. Fawcett, ed., DecliningJurisdiction in PrivateInternational
Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); T.Carbonneau, "Mitsubishi: the Folly of
Quixotic Internationalism" (1986) 2 Arbitration Int'l 116 at 125; A. Lowenfeld,
InternationalLitigation and the QuestforReasonableness(Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1996);J. Paul, "Comity in International Law" (1991) 32 Harv. Int'l L.J. 1. Paul
groups many of these reforms under his more expansive definition of "comity."
I believe that comity is more narrowly concerned with interstate cooperation,
and so I prefer the term "internationalist policy" for the range of economic,
political, and moral arguments required to support a practice of comity.
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common standards across jurisdictions (uniformity), an increased
deference to foreign laws and processes (comity), and a greater
enforcement of party autonomy (autonomy).
First, a number of the reforms are intended to increase certainty
and predictability in the rules and processes of private international law. For example, the move in Tolofson to choice of law rules
based on the lex loci delicti arguably has the virtue of setting a rule
that is simpler than one based on multiple different considerations and exceptions. Regular enforcement of foreign judgments
as envisaged by Morguard is thought to assist parties to understand
that they should defend foreign suits unless there is very clearly a
lack of connection of the foreign jurisdiction to the action. Multilateral conventions, such as the Convention on Jurisdiction and
the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters
(Brussels Convention) ,146 increase certainty by setting uniform
grounds for jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement, and by
reducingjudicial discretion to stay actions or to refuse to recognize
and enforce.
Second, the tetralogy's efforts to reform Canadian private international law in accordance with foreign practices can promote
the objective of increasing the uniformity of private international
law rules. Existing conventions, such as the New York Convention,
as well as proposed conventions, such as the Hague Conference
discussions with respect to recognition and enforcement of judgments, would clearly increase uniformity of private international
law rules acrossjurisdictions. In Tolofson, the Supreme Court seemed
to consider that a common rigid rule of choice of law in tort would
help to control for variations in applicable laws that would invite
forum shopping and cause uncertainty. 147 The turn to constitutionalization, which is suggested in Morguard and expressly decided in
Hunt, places limits on the ability of provincial courts and legislatures to adopt completely different rules.
Third, the reforms share a policy of comity, in the sense of a
greater respect and deference for the jurisdiction, the substantive
laws, and the judgments of foreign jurisdictions. The eased standards for stays of actions based on forum non conveniens, the greater
facility of recognition and enforcement, the discouragement of antisuit injunctions, the use of choice of law rules based on factors other
than the interest-analysis of the forum state, all involve municipal
146

'

Brussels Convention, supra note 8 3 .
Tolofson, supranote 1 at 1052.
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courts revising their approach to international cases in order to
better recognize the laws and the courts of otherjurisdictions.
Fourth, the reforms in the tetralogy reinforce party autonomy in
dispute resolution. The restrictions on anti-suit injunctions set out
in Amchem and the emphasis on comity in recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments articulated in Morguard increase the
effectiveness of the choice by plaintiffs as to where to proceed
with litigation. The tetralogy also occurs against a backdrop, most
pronounced with respect to international arbitration, in which
Canadian courts are increasingly reluctant to interfere with disputeresolution processes that are agreed to by parties. Choice of law,
forum selection, and arbitration clauses are increasingly supported
14
by national courts. 1
These general characteristics of internationalist reform in private international law are not very compelling as ends in themselves.
For example, neither deference to foreign courts nor predictability
of rules would seem to be worthwhile on their own. Rather, laws
with such characteristics are justified because they serve more
fundamental normative objectives. While the ultimate justification
or motivation for any actual legal decision or legal reform is complex and can always be disputed, I posit significant explanatory
power in background political, economic, and moral objectives
related to the international system. An understanding of internationalist policy argumentation is an important part of contemporary policy debate in private international law and a significant
concern and challenge for effective advocacy in the field.
COSMOPOLITANISM AND ANTI-PAROCHIALISM

Thejudgments of the tetralogy argue strongly for a cosmopolitan
spirit in common law adjudication with respect to matters that cross
provincial and national borders. In Morguard,149 for example, the
court stated that contemporary private international law should
reject a parochial inclination to act only as if in a bounded world.
Traditional private international law is an easy target for a cosmopolitan critique because in its sources and orientation it is
clearly a kind of municipal law. In terms of sources, issues of private
international law are not, as has been discussed earlier, the subject
148 SeeJ-G. Castel andJ. Walker, eds., CanadianConflict of Laws, 5 th ed. (Toronto:
Butterworths, 2002)

at sections 13.7

(forum selection), 31.2(a)

choice of law in contract), 15.3-15.4 (arbitration clauses).
149 Morguard,supranote 1 at 1 o98.

(express

16o
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of either customary public international law or conventional public international law. Rather, domestic legislatures, and, in common
lawjurisdictions, the courts, have been the source of relevant laws. 150
In addition, in terms of policy orientation, private international
law has focused on the policy concerns of the jurisdictions in which
the courts or legislatures are situated. For example, the limited
"public policy" exception in the common law rules on recognition
and enforcement has been oriented towards the public policy of
the court considering recognition, not the public policy concerns
of foreign jurisdictions.' 1
Non-domestic concerns have played an indirect role in traditional private international law. Sometimes this role has been
played through doctrines, such as the comity concerns of Joseph
Story, which are thought to also be in the long-term self-interest of
the jurisdiction in question. 152 At other times, cosmopolitan interests have, intentionally or not, been protected through rules, such
as the vested rights approach of A.V. Dicey, which shift the focus
away from domestic interests and onto the formal characteristics
of different legal relations. 55 As often, cosmopolitanism has been a
form of critique that has hovered over policy debate in private
international law, calling on legislators and adjudicators to act in
a non-parochial "spirit." It is this kind of reforming spirit that is
brought to the fore in the tetralogy.
Cosmopolitanism argues that policymakers take a normative
standpoint that includes the interests and values of individuals and
societies outside of a defined state jurisdiction. 54 The cosmopolitan view argues that it is improper to restrict one's normative judgments to a consideration of the interests and values of the home
jurisdiction. This normative approach, which has been associated
with moral and political theories from natural law through global
liberalism, rejects the identification of normative boundaries with
juridical boundaries. A liberal theory of rights, for example, would
150

Dicey & Morris, supra note

92

at 1-2; Castel, supra note so at 4-5.

151 See, for example, Dicey & Morris, supranote 92 at 88-91.
52

InJ. Story, Commentarieson the Conflict ofLaws (Boston: Hilliard, Gray and Company, 1834) at 34, Joseph Story notes that comity was based on the idea of laws
which arise from mutual interest and utility, from a sense of the inconveniences
that would result from a contrary doctrine, and from a sort of moral necessity to
do justice in order that justice may be done to us in return.
A.V. Dicey, A Digest of the Law of Englandwith Reference to the Conflict of Laws (London: Stevens and Sons, 1896).
T. Pogge, "Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty"

(1992)

103 Ethics 48.
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question whether an individual with weak connections to the jurisdiction of a court and, hence, who is unable to vote or otherwise
participate in the polity, is properly subject to the authority of the
15
state's legal institutions. 1
Such general theories of morality are sometimes useful in legal
debate. They act as a reminder to state actors, such as common
law judges, to consider more broadly the way in which moral obligations do not end at the border. To use Justice La Forest's
phrase from the international criminal law context, "we are all our
brother's keeper." 156 The claims of cosmopolitan concern are especially powerful as the number of social, political, economic, and
cultural ties that cross borders increase due to the dramatic
changes in communications, transportation, migration, and mar15 7
kets that we associate with globalization.
Obviously, there is a limit to what cosmopolitanism can offer in
terms of legal decision-making. The basic problem is simply that
moral arguments of cosmopolitanism provide limited institutional
guidance. As Thomas Pogge observes, moral cosmopolitanism does
not equate to legal cosmopolitanism. 15 8 Moral cosmopolitanism is
concerned with the belief "that all persons stand in certain moral
relations to one another: we are required to respect one another's
status as ultimate units of moral concern - a requirement that
imposes limits on our conduct and, in particular, upon our efforts
to construct institutional schemes." 15 9 This moral position may or
may not support legal cosmopolitanism, which Pogge defines as
involving -'a concrete political ideal of a global order under which
all persons have equivalent legal rights and duties, that is, are fellow citizens of a universal republic. 1 60 It seems clear that various
155 Brilmayer, supranote 55 at 206.
156

Rv. Libman, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178 at 213-14.

117 See, for example, A. von Mehren and D. Trautman, "Recognition of Foreign

Adjudications: A Survey and A Suggested Approach" (1968) 81 Harv. L. Rev.
16oi at 1603:
The ultimate justification for affording some degree of recognition is
that if in our highly complex and interrelated world each community
exhausted every possibility of insisting on its parochial interests, injustice
would result and the normal patterns of life would be disrupted.
The court in Morguardquotes this passage, supra note i at 1097.
158 Pogge, supra note 154 at 48-49.

159Ibid.
160

Ibid. at 49.
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kinds of institutional arrangements are consistent with moral cosmopolitanism. For example, instead of supranational government,
cosmopolitans might also support the growth of international
organizations or transnational processes such as the international
market, telecommunications, and transportation, each of which
seems to bypass governance through traditional forms of government. 61Alternatively, some cosmopolitans believe that the creative
use of international markets and transnational civil society networks can be combined with the preservation of the nation-state
system to present an alternative to the need for supranational insti62
tutions or law.'
It follows that it is difficult to determine the implications of
moral cosmopolitanism for specific doctrines of private international law. In order to generate more specific institutional recommendations, it seems that the cosmopolitanism expressed in the
tetralogy is linked to, and identified with, two other general policy
goals that are central commitments of liberal internationalism: on
the economic level, support for international commerce and trade
and, on the political level, support for interstate cooperation and
comity.
TRADE AND COMMERCE

The internationalist reform in the tetralogy brings the discourse
of international commerce into the area of private international
law. In Morguard, for example, Justice La Forest, in a key passage,
writes that "[t] he business community operates in a world economy
even in the face of decentralized political and legal power. Accommodating the flow of wealth, skills and peoples across state lines has
become imperative.' 16 In Tolofson, Justice La Forest again invokes
contemporary international economic order, and observes that
"[s] tability of transactions and well grounded legal expectations
must be respected.' 16 4 The choice of a rigid choice of law rule of
lex loci delicti was informed by the supposed value of a predictable
and clear rule for the purposes of economic planning. Similarly,
in Hunt,Justice La Forest observed that one of the problems of a
161 This corresponds to the cosmopolitans identified by Kennedy, supra note 104

at 13.
162See, for example, Slaughter, supra note i 20.
163

6

Morguard,supra note i at 1096.
Tolofson, supranote i at 1051.
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commerce
blocking statute was that "it discourages international
65
and efficient allocation and conduct of litigation.'1
The view that reform of traditional private international law is
needed to promote international commerce is found in other internationalist reform venues, such as in the support for the Brussels
Convention and the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome Convention) in Europe, 166 and in the
push at the Hague Conference for a multilateral convention on
167
jurisdiction and recognition and the enforcement ofjudgments.
The policy objective of promoting international commerce has
registered as a powerful rhetorical tool even in jurisdictions where
internationalist arguments normally are not persuasive. 16 The
objective clearly impacts on other areas of law as well, such as with
respect to doctrines concerning the commercial activity exception
169
to sovereign immunity.
International commerce is also increasingly advocated as an
important policy objective among scholars and theorists of private
international law. Although commercial concerns were often considered of secondary significance, the objective of facilitating international commerce was a long-established public policy goal in the
foundational scholarship in private international law, for example,

165 Hunt, supra note

i at 327.

166Brussels and Rome Conventions, supranote 83. See, for example, Report on the

167

Convention on the Law Applicable to ContractualObligations, 1979 O.J. (C 5 9 ) 1, 4-5
(Giuliano-Lagarde Report), reprinted in R. Plender, The European Contracts Convention: The Rome Convention on the Choice of Law for Contracts, Annex V (London:
Sweet and Maxwell, 1991); Dicey & Morris, supranote 92 at 1195. For this view
of the European regime, see R. Brand, "Recognition of Foreign Judgments as a
Trade Law Issue: The Economics of Private International Law," in J. Bhandari
and A. Sykes, eds., Economic Dimensions in InternationalLaw: Comparative and
EmpiricalPerspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 592.
See, for example, Black, supranote 85.

168

See, for example, the United States Supreme Court decision in Mitsubishi Motors,
supra note 127 at 629-39 (per Blackmun J.). For a discussion of this case,
Morguard, and the policy discourses of liberal internationalism, see R. Wai,
"Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The Regulatory Function of
Private International Law in an Era of Globalization" (2002) 40 Colum. J.

Transnat'l Law 209 at 2 24-29.
169 See R. Wai, 'The Commercial Activity Exception to Sovereign Immunity and
the Boundaries of Contemporary International Legalism," in C. Scott, ed., Torture as Tort: ComparativePerspectives on the Development of TransnationalHuman

Rights Litigation (Oxford: Hart,

2001) 213.
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in the work of Ulrik Huber170andJoseph Story.1 7 1 Nonetheless, traditional private international law regimes have often been described
by contemporary scholars as commercially dysfunctional. 172 Such
writers criticize the system of national court adjudication as an
archaic process that is based on sovereigntist conceptions that do
not attend to the realities and the needs of the contemporary international economy.

173

In contemporary policy discourse, the concern for international
commerce connects two well-established sets of theoretical ideas,
which are familiar policy objectives in other fields of law such as
international trade regulation and the laws of international business transactions.174 First, theorists concerned with international
trade fear that national courts act as protectionist actors who use
the play in the laws to advance national interests rather than the
mutually beneficial objective of facilitating international transactions according to theories of comparative advantage.'17 Second,
efficiency analysis and transaction cost analysis suggest that the
patchwork of national conflict of laws regimes, in addition to the
disparities in the underlying substantive laws of states, generate
costly uncertainty, 176 lead to overlapping litigation processes that
waste resources, and permit forum-shopping and other kinds of
77
strategic behaviour by individual parties.

170

U. Huber, De Conflictu Legum, translated in D.J. Llewelyn Davies, 'The Influence

171

of Huber's De Conflictu Legum on English Private International Law" ( 937) 18
Brit. YB. Int'l L. 49 at 65-66.
Story, supra note 152 at 34. See more generally, D. Bederman, "Compulsory

172

Pilotage, Public Policy and the Early Private International Law of Torts" (199 o )
64 Tulane L.Rev. 1033.
See, for example, Brand, supra note 166; M. Pryles, "Tort and Related Obliga-

173

tions in Private International Law" (1991) 2 27 Rec. des Cours 9.
See, for example, Pryles, supra note 17 2 at 2 8.

174 Brand, supra note 166, pairs these two kinds of arguments in advocating liber175

alized rules on recognition ofjudgments.
See, for example, Brand, supra note 166 at 613-26.

176

This concern is, of course, connected to the perpetual debate in most areas of

law concerning the value of rules versus standards and certainty versus flexibility. See, for example, P. Hay, "Flexibility versus Predictability and Uniformity in
Choice of Law: Reflections on Current European and United States Conflict
Law" (1991) 226 Rec. des Cours 281.
117 See, for example, M. Whincop and M. Keyes, Policy and Pragmatismin the Conflict
of Laws (Aldershot UK. Ashgate, 2001 ) c. 8.
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TransactionCosts
Theoretical support for internationalist reform of private international law is partly based on economic arguments that aggregate
economic benefits are maximized by rules that promote predictability and uniformity and that thereby reduce transaction CoStS. 7 8
Reforms that increase uniformity and predictability are also thought
to control the wasteful litigation costs associated with forumshopping by plaintiffs.
Uncertainty makes it difficult to assess risk accurately, and, therefore, uncertainty increases transaction costs. 179 When risks are ascertainable, it is claimed, parties are able to allocate risks between
themselves and undertake planning in that light, for example,
through insurance, diversification, or reserve provisions.'s8 However, an adequate assessment of risk is not always possible because of
imperfect information. Uncertainty may prevent parties from allocating risks between themselves or to third parties in an optimal
way.1 81 In any event, risk assessment and allocation is not costless.
Complex or unascertainable risk increases the cost of most transactions (for example, through the amount of an insurance premium), and it may prevent altogether some marginal transactions.
The objective of reducing transaction costs is served, it is claimed,
by doctrinal reforms such as the clear international allocation of
jurisdiction. In one such view, jurisdiction should be assumed only
by the courts with the most significant connections to the dispute, a
goal that is served by treaties such as the Brussels Convention and
by doctrines such as forum non conveniens. Restraint by courts in
assuming jurisdiction would restrict suits proceeding in multiple
178

Transactions costs analysis in law builds from the foundational work of Ronald

Coase; see, for example, R. Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the Law (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1988).
179 See, for example, D.C. North, Institutions,InstitutionalChange and EconomicPerformance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 199o) at 126.
180 The importance and complexity of insurance for risk in international com-

181

merce is discussed in V. Haufler, Dangerous Commerce: Insuranceand the Management of InternationalRisk (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).
This could be done through contractual allocation between the parties, diversification, or insurance. The idea that parties cannot and do not allocate
unknown risks has been disputed; see, for example, G. Triantis, "Contractual
Allocations of Unknown Risks: A Critique of the Doctrine of Commercial
Impracticability" (1992) 42 Univ. Toronto. L.J. 450; for a compromise view, see
M. Trebilcock, The Limits on Freedom of Contract, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993) at 127-28, 138, and 144.
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jurisdictions or in jurisdictions with weak connections to the dispute and, thereby, would reduce litigation costs such as lawyers
fees, travel costs, and time lost for witnesses and parties to attend
process. Furthermore, both clear rules allocating jurisdiction and
restraint through doctrines such as forum non conveniens would reduce the costs associated with the strategic behaviour related to the
determination of the most appropriate jurisdiction.
Efficiency is also arguably served by respect for party choice of
law and forum selection clauses, clear rules concerning choice of
law, and easy recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
and arbitral awards across state borders. These reforms increase
predictability and permit parties to formulate expectations and
plan for contingencies arising out of potential legal disputes.18 2 In
addition, greater predictability will act as an incentive for parties
to make rational assessments of the likelihood of success of different jurisdictional strategies and, hence, deter frivolous suits with
limited likelihood of success.
Uniformity of rules across jurisdictions is also thought to reduce
transaction costs by reducing the range of possible outcomes and
easing the assessment of risks. The ideal would be the standardization of rules promoted by the implementation of international conventions, such as the New York Convention with respect to foreign
arbitral awards or the Brussels or Rome Conventions in Europe.
However, convergence on doctrines such as forum non conveniens
would also serve this purpose.
Finally, granting parties to business transactions the autonomy
and flexibility to structure their relations through contractual provisions such as choice of law and forum selection clauses might
permit them to increase predictability and also to allocate risks
optimally. Enforcing party choice as to private international law
issues allows parties to make more predictable their potential liabilities, to reduce costly and inconvenient uncertainty, and to plan
transactions and insurance accordingly. 8 3 More generally, reformist writers identify arbitration and other forms of alternative dispute resolution as a superior mode for resolution of international
8 4
private disputes.1
They link such forms to the lex mercatoriathat
182

p. Nygh, 'The Reasonable Expectations of the Parties as a Guide to Choice of
Law in Contract and Tort" (1995) 251 Rec. des Cours 268.

183 North, supra note 6o at 183.
184J.Jackson, W. Davey, and A. Sykes, eds., Legal Problems ofInternationalEconomic

Relations, 3rd ed. (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing, 1995) at 73-8 1.

Transformationof CanadianPrivateInt'lLaw
was developed in the period before the rise of the modern nationstate.1 85 Party autonomy over dispute resolution is argued to limit
defects of national court systems such as unpredictability over the
applicable laws, the possibility of bias, and uncertainty over the
quality and expertise of adjudicators.
PromotingInternationalTrade
In addition to the objective of minimizing transaction costs in
international commerce, internationalist reform to private international law rules also draws on the concern in international trade
theory of achieving the aggregate benefits of international trade
based on comparative economic advantage rather than trade dictated by the narrow interests protected by juridical boundaries
of states. Rules of private international law and private law can be
argued to operate as barriers to trade according to comparative
advantage. International trade regulation has traditionally been
most concerned with trade barriers involving border measures
such as tariffs and quotas. However, as the international trade regulation regime has extended in scope and depth, regulation has
become increasingly concerned with domestic policies that have
either the aim or the effect of obstructing international trade such
as internal taxes, intellectual property laws, technical standards,
1l 6
and health and safety regulations.
The concern with domestic policies plausibly extends to private
law and private international law. Private law and civil procedures
may be governmental measures that have the purpose or the effect
of discriminating against foreign producers in order to protect
domestic producers. State legislatures and courts may favour
domestic economic interests in a way that is harmful not just to
1 7
particular foreign interests but also to global economic welfare. 1
185See, for example, L. Trakman, The Law Merchant: The Evolution of Commercial
Law (Littleton, CO: Fred B. Rothman, 1983).
See, for example,J.Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of lnternationalEconomicRelations, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997) at 13o; F.
Roessler, "Diverging Domestic Policies and Multilateral Trade Integration," in
J. Bhagwati and R. Hudec, Fair Trade and Harmonization: Prerequisitesfor Free
Trade?vol. 2 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1996) 21.
187 The potential links of private law and international trade are raised by the chal'8

lenge in Loewen Group Inc. and Raymond Loewen v. United States ofAmerica, ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/ 9 8/3, Notice of Claim, October 30, 1998 [hereinafter
Loewen v. United States] under Chapter i of the North American Free Trade
Agreement, December 17, 1992, Can T.S. 1994 No.2, (1993) 32 I.L.M. 605
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Protectionism through private international law could come in various forms. For example, a court might decide whether or not to
assume jurisdiction based on whether a plaintiff or defendant is
from the jurisdiction. A court may be motivated to protect domestic
interests in applying a choice of law rule rather than by attempting
to figure out which substantive rule would be the most appropriate
from an efficiency or regulatory perspective. Similarly, a jurisdiction might restrict recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments against defendants from its own jurisdiction, either through
a blanket rule or through biased application of a discretionary
standard.
The Quebec legislation considered in the Hunt case seems, from
an international trade perspective, to have been enacted for a protectionist purpose. As the Supreme Court of Canada noted, blocking statutes of this kind are intended to discourage suits in foreign
jurisdictions against domestic defendants by making it procedurally more difficult for the foreign suit to proceed by, for example,
impeding discovery or document production.""8 A more familiar
example is found in the disputes between the United States and
other jurisdictions concerning the enforcement of judgments
obtained under the private litigation of antitrust suits. Many foreign jurisdictions have refused to enforce such judgments and,
indeed, have legislated "clawback" provisions that permit defendants to recover any damages awarded to the plaintiffs in foreign
antitrust litigation.1 89 While genuine differences concerning antitrust policy are at stake, at least part of the concern of foreign
governments is the effect of foreign antitrust laws on the economic
welfare of businesses and industries based in their jurisdictions.
Internationalist reforms can be partly viewed as attempts to ensure
that such strategic behaviour does not occur through the mechanisms of private international law.
The most effective discipline on economic protectionism through
private international law would be a binding international treaty
among states such as the Brussels Convention. Short of such conventions, reforms with the characteristics of the tetralogy might
[hereinafter NAFTA]. This case is discussed later in this article under the heading "Recognition and Enforcement ofJudgments: The Example of US Punitive
Damage Awards."
15 Hunt, supranote s at 327-2 8.
1'9See, for example, Protection of Trading Interests Act 198o , s.6 (U.K.); Foreign
Extraterritorial Measures Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-29, S.9.

Transformationof CanadianPrivateInt'l Law
be justified as a partial control against protectionism. For example,
protectionism could be discouraged through predictable rules such
as the rigid lex loci delicti rule from Tolofson and through the use of
forum non conveniens restraints as in Amchem. Similarly, respect for
the choices of parties with respect to choice of law, forum-selection,
and arbitration are thought to limit the potential biases of national
courts to engage in sub rosa favouritism towards parties with domestic connections.
INTERSTATE COOPERATION

The objective of international trade according to comparative
advantage is connected to perhaps the central internationalist
policy objective of promoting interstate cooperation. The goal of
cooperative interstate relations has figured less prominently in private international law, but the tetralogy has re-emphasized orderly
and friendly inter-jurisdictional relations.
Cooperation in public international law is commonly used to support various forms of international institutions or treaties. In private international law, this awareness of inter-jurisdictional relations
has been more associated with the spirit of comity. Comity would
serve the purpose of promoting interstate cooperation through increased deference to foreign laws, through more restraint in assumption of jurisdiction, and through greater willingness to recognize
foreign judgments. It is also reflected in the restrictions on the use
of pre-emptive procedural tactics such as anti-suit injunctions, as
in Amchem, or blocking statutes, as in Hunt.
Comity, which had not featured prominently in Canadian law,
was elevated to a key principle of private international law in the
Morguard decision. 9 ° Subsequently, the comity principle, and often
the same quote from Morguard, has been repeated in lower court
judgments and in other Supreme Court of Canada judgments,
including the tetralogy. For example, in Amchem, Justice Sopinka
quoted from Morguard for the proposition that comity would limit
the use of anti-suit injunctions, 191 and he proceeded to conclude
that the failure to respect comity was what might invite an anti-suit
injunction from a Canadian court.'92 The constitutional analysis

190Morguard, supranote i at 1o96-97.
191 Amchem, supranote 1 at 913-14.

2 Ibid. at 934.
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of the blocking statute in Hunt also fixes on the "'central" idea of
19 3
comity from Morguard.
The concerns for comity and cooperation are partly a concern
with rationalizing unseemly and dangerous battles between different state courts. More importantly, it is based on a sense that cooperation is to the mutual benefit of all jurisdictions involved. Among
these cooperative benefits would be the benefits of international
commerce described earlier, but they also extend beyond commercial interests.
RegulatingInterstateDispute Settlement
Nothing is as central to public international law as the objective
of an international process that will avoid recourse to armed conflict for settlement of international disputes. The concern with
cooperative international process is also central to the effort of
international trade law regimes to develop a multilateral process
to replace the harmful spiral of unilateral tit-for-tat retaliation that
undermines the cooperative benefits of liberal free trade.
There is a tendency to uncritically identify expanding legalistic
process, even in fields such as private international law, with the
greater achievement of interstate peace. A focus on legalistic court
adjudication may distract attention from alternative international
dispute settlement processes. Support for international legal process also has the tendency to abstract from the substantive justice of
the underlying dispute. Nonetheless, the conduct of international
relations through peaceful means remains a powerful basic justification for international law. 194
Realizing CooperativeBenefits
The basic concern that interstate disputes be resolved by peaceful
means is further augmented by the idea that cooperative institutions and binding rules assist the achievement of uncontroversial, mutually beneficial objectives. The challenge of international
193

Hunt, supranote 1 at 3 1-2 7.

194 It

is arguably the achievement of this effect that informs all the obfuscation of

doctrine, process, and institutions that David Kennedy has identified as being
central to international law; D. Kennedy, InternationalLegal Structures (BadenBaden: Nomos Verl.-Ges., 1987). The important objective is that states, for all
the obscurities introduced by international law doctrine and process, are at
least arguing about their concerns in terms of law and in legal institutions,
rather than in terms of, and using the instruments of, pure power.
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anarchy, in which there is no overarching authority over states, is
that sovereign states may fail to realize cooperative benefits, such
as the productive gains of liberal free trade or international peace.
A common way to explain the cooperative benefits objective in private international law is to use game theory models that have been
widely applied in international relations. 195 For example, Larry
Kramer and Lea Brilmayer deploy classic game theory models, such
as Prisoner's Dilemma, the Stag Hunt, and the Game of Chicken,
to illuminate choice of law problems. 196 These simple games are
intended to model situations where short-term self-interest will lead
participants towards outcomes that are less favourable to each of
them than if they cooperate. Cooperation is impeded by the lack of
trust and the absence of a coordinating authority to ensure that the
other side does not cheat. In this context, parties are not able to
make and enforce credible commitments to each other.
In the choice of law situation, for example, a game theoretic
model suggests that autonomous states, through their own courts
and perhaps under the instruction of legislatures, will define their
own interest. Following the many choice of law approaches that
lead them to prefer their own self-interest, they will apply forum
law. If each jurisdiction makes this decision, however, there may be
situations where all sides do less well than they would if each was
less rigid in guarding its particular interest in every case. If appropriate institutions were developed, a court in State A might apply
the law of State B in some situations in order that, in other situations, State B might apply the law of State A where State A may have
a greater interest.
The best institutional solution would be a binding arrangement,
such as an international treaty like the Brussels Convention, which
195L. Kramer, "Rethinking Choice of Law" (199o) 90 Columbia L. Rev. 277 at
339-45; Brilmayer, supranote 55 at c. 4. For an early example of the use in international law of game theory models taken from international relations, see
K Abbott, "Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers" (1989) 14 YaleJ. Int'l L. 335.
196Brilmayer, supra note 55 at 156. Modern game theory builds from the work of
J. Von Neumann and 0. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1944). For the classic expositions
of game theory and international relations and the texts most influential in
international law, see T. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 196o) and R. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New
York: Basic Books, 1984). More generally on the use of game theory in law, see
D. Baird, R. Gertner, and R. Picker, Game Theory and the Law (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1994).
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commits each state to act in a cooperative fashion. Similarly, federal constitutional provisions, such as the United States "full faith
and credit" clause, permit parties to act cooperatively since states
are committed to act in less parochial ways and other states can
rely on such constrained behaviour. This kind of discipline is arguably what the Supreme Court of Canada is achieving through the
constitutionalization of some limits on conflict of laws rules in
Morguardand in Hunt.
Without such treaty-based or constitutional disciplines, principles of comity might encourage a rough form of reciprocity and
cooperation. 9 7 Reciprocity is especially useful where there are repeated interactions and different states can get a better sense of
which other states can be relied on to cooperate.1 98 However, the
difficulties for this sort of reciprocity are numerous, including insufficient iterations of the game, inadequate information on each
state's interests or preferences, free rider problems, difficulties
in monitoring defection, and complexities in coordinating judges
within each state. 9 9 Nonetheless, cooperative benefits can be
achieved in a "diffuse" manner and, over time, courts may genuinely take better account of the interests of foreign parties and
jurisdictions, whether through notions of comity or doctrines that
focus more on neutral factors such as vested rights. 200 In addition,
emerging norms of cooperation, such as the comity doctrine or a
rigid lex loci delicti rule with respect to tort, might provide "focal
point solutions" for coordination. 20 ' This kind of rough reciprocity
may be what the court was looking for in Amchem before granting
an anti-suit injunction when it explored whether the foreign court
had failed to observe the principles of comity with which Canadian
20 2
courts were concerned.

"I

Brilmayer, supra note 55 at 184 -87; Axelrod, supra note 196.
195 at 342-44.

19 Kramer, supra note

Ibid. at 343, n. 228.
00 Brilmayer, supranote 55 at 188-89 (contrasting "diffuse reciprocity" to "specific

'9

reciprocity"); Kramer, supra note 195 at 344, discusses the interesting example
of the development of rules with respect to the recognition of foreign judgments in the pre-revolutionary era in the United States.
201Brilmayer, supra note 55 at 185. The concept is developed by Schelling in The
Strategy of Conflict, supra note 196; Kramer, supra note 195. See also L. Kramer,
"More Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws" (1991) 24
Cornell Int'l L.J. 245.
202 Amchem, supra note i at 934.
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Convergence
The argument for achieving cooperative benefits even without
binding international or constitutional laws is reinforced by a belief
in the convergence in both the underlying private laws and the private international law rules of different jurisdictions around the
world. Convergence in the laws and values of differentjurisdictions
seems to make it empirically more likely and morally morejustified
for courts to engage in a practice such as comity. In Tolofson, for
example, the notion of convergence in applicable laws suggested
to Justice La Forest that plaintiffs and defendants would not have
much at stake in the different choice of laws.20 In Morguard,a faith
in shared basic values helps to explain why, with respect to rules of
jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement, it would not really
matter which court considered a claim so long as it had a real and
20 4
substantial connection to the dispute.
Such arguments recall theories of international relations that
argue that a fundamental underlying convergence of values among
states should make a difference to interstate relations. In particular,
theorists developing insights from Kant have argued that liberal
states infrequently go to war with other liberal states. 205 With respect to law, it is argued that, similarly, a convergence in domestic
laws and values should lead to a distinctive pattern of international
legal relations. Anne-Marie Slaughter, for example, contends that
among liberal states there is more room for transnational dialogue
206
among courts, with increased borrowing, cooperation, and comity.
Slaughter characterizes conflict of laws and choice of law in this
situation of basic convergence of liberal values as a "reciprocal
dialogue in which courts of different States engaged in a common

203

Tolofson, supra note i at 1059.
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Morguard, supranote i.

The concept of the liberal peace is taken from I. Kant, "Perpetual Peace," in T.
Humphrey, ed., PerpetualPeace and Other Essays (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983). The modern restatement of the concept as an empirical
claim concerning contemporary international relations is found in M. Doyle,
"Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs: Parts One and Two" (1983) 12
Philosophy and Public Affairs 205 and 325. See also B. Russett, Grasping the
Democratic Peace: Principlesfor a Post Cold-War World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1993); A. Moravscik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal
Theory of International Politics" (1997) 51 International Organization 513.
106 Slaughter, supranote 138.
205
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endeavor to make transnational relations among individuals more
certain and predictable while taking account of multiple State
interests. 20 7 From this conception, it follows that (I) courts will
face fewer constraints on their application of foreign law, (2)
within a "zone of legitimate difference," courts will "presume the
legitimacy of a wide range of different means to achieve similar
ends" and will only refuse to apply a foreign law where "the potentially applicable laws reflect different choices as to which of those
values should trump";208 and (3) courts will recognize "a common
core of political and economic values that will preserve roughly the
same boundary between 'political' and 'legal' questions as would
exist in domestic cases. '20 9 The process of transjudicial dialogue
among the courts of liberal states will be reinforced by the "density
and velocity of transnational transactions among liberal states,"
such as trade, which are leading to convergence in the underlying
range of state laws. 10
Convergence is thought to operate with respect to both rules
of private international law and underlying substantive laws. For
example, the Supreme Court of Canada in Amchem seemed to think
it was presumptuous with respect to anti-suit injunctions to assume
that a Texas court would not exercise appropriate restraint in its
decision of whether to assume jurisdiction. However, both on the
face of Texas laws and with respect to the conduct of the Texas
court in the particular case, it was clear that the rules of private
international law in Texas were very different from the Canadian
rules being applied by the Supreme Court of Canada in its decision.
In particular, the Canadian forum non conveniens analysis that the
court approved in Amchem was specifically not part of the Texas law
at that time. 11
THE RELATIONSHIP AMONG INTERNATIONALIST POLICY VALUES

Each internationalist policy value has a separate logic and justification. In addition, internationalist policy values are often presented and understood as providing reinforcing, mutual support
for the same kinds of reforms. For example, reforms that promote
207 Ibid. at 524.

208 Ibid. at 525.
209

Ibid.

211 Ibid. at 521.
211

Silberman, supra note 43.
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common and uniform rules are defended as aiding economic
efficiency through increasing certainty and predictability, promoting cooperative behaviour through limits on strategic manipulation by differentjurisdictions, and achieving cosmopolitan fairness
by avoiding parochial application of local rules and standards. The
sense of reciprocal support among goals as general as commerce,
cooperation, and cosmopolitanism, however, permits two kinds of
bootstrapping.
First, internationalist reforms are often presented as an overall
package, which is then justified as the best available overall package of reforms. For example, reforms intended to strengthen the
protection of contractual enforcement are lumped together with
reforms geared to controlling the de novo review of recognition and
enforcement of judgments, as if these two reforms were necessary
to each other.
Second, reforms that are not fully sustainable under one of the
policy goals are given additional, incremental support through the
belief that they are at least partly consistent with the other policy
goals. The linkage of economic arguments for free trade to arguments concerning the cosmopolitan case for free trade has a particularly strong rhetorical effect. The rhetoric of non-discrimination
is central to the trade disciplines of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), including, for example, the most-favoured-nation principle (non-discrimination among different trading partners) and the
national treatment principle (non-discrimination between foreign
and domestic parties).212 Free traders often wrap the arguments for
free movement of goods into a general claim that only this position
is consistent with a moral cosmopolitanism that does not discriminate against foreigners. 213 It has been argued earlier in this article
212 For example, Articles I and III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
213

October 30, 1947,55 U.N.T.S 194, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 [hereinafter GATT].
See, for example, Trebilcock, supranote 181 at c. 9. In that chapter, Trebilcock
groups together as "discrimination," human rights discrimination, immigration policy, and restrictions on free trade. The connection between liberal attitudes towards free trade and to migration are also evoked in M. Trebilcock and
R. Howse, The Regulation of International Trade, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge,
1999) at 1, 13, and 14. There are, however, arguably as many differences as similarities between these topics from a discrimination perspective. For example,
the "discrimination" contained in trade restrictions often has less serious consequences for disadvantaged groups and such restrictions are also often justifiable in a way that the other kinds of discrimination are not.
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that this connection is questionable if moral cosmopolitanism is
properly distinguished from institutional or legal cosmopolitanism. 214 More generally, this approach fails to acknowledge that the
three internationalist policy goals often do not each provide support for a particular internationalist reform. Indeed, sometimes
the three internationalist goals can be in tension with each other.
The examination of internationalist public policy values at high
levels of generality and abstraction obscures the lack of mutual support and potential conflicts among the three values.
The linkage among international commerce, international cooperation, and cosmopolitanism has deep foundations in traditions
of international liberalism. For example, the belief in the "civilizing" force of commerce on international affairs was an important
part of liberal arguments for the virtues of a capitalist economic system. In early versions of this hypothesis, a growth in international
commerce would create a sense of "interests" that would overcome
irrational dynastic and imperial "passions. '215 Later British liberals, such as Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Richard Cobden,
and Norman Angell, argued that free trade would assist peace in
a number of ways, including through a recognition that national
economic self-interest was not served by military conflict and
through the creation of a transnational class of cooperative in2 16
terests whose self-interests would demand international peace.
In turn, webs of economic self-interest should reinforce the inclination against wasteful international political conflict. 217 Such
214

See the section entitled "Cosmopolitanism and Anti-Parochialism" earlier in

215

this article.
See A.O. Hirschman, The Passionsand the Interests:PoliticalArgumentsfor Capital-

ism beforeIts Triumph (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977) at 79-82.
Hirschman is mainly concerned with seventeenth- and eighteenth-century writers, such as Montesquieu and James Steuart. The idea of the doux commerce as
a civilizing function continued on in liberal writings on international trade. For
example, Mill ends his influential chapter on international trade with the
observation that "the economical advantages of commerce are surpassed in
importance by those of its effects which are intellectual and moral"; Mill, supra
note 14o at 581-82.
216 Joseph Nye labels these two categories of liberal internationalists as "commercial/trade" liberals and "sociological/transnational" liberals; seeJ. Nye, "Neorealism and Neoliberalism" (1988) 40 World Politics 235 at 245-47. More
generally, see M. Ceadel, Thinking about Peace and War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) especially chapters 6 and 7.
217See, for example, R. Cobden, Russia, -836, in R. Cobden, PoliticalWritings of
Richard Cobden (London: Unwin, 1903)

122 at 222-25.
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historical conceptions of the interlocking importance of commerce, peace, and cosmopolitanism reinforce the sense that policy
reforms directed towards any one of these objectives are also supported by the other policy objectives.
The grouping together of internationalist reform proposals as
one overall package and the lumping together of the three internationalist policy goals to provide one overall justification of the
reform package obscures careful consideration of internationalist reforms. Internationalist reform in private international law
and more generally should not be understood simply as a package
deal. Both the set of internationalist reforms and the package of
internationalist policy justifications for such reform need to be
disaggregated.
PART

5:

THE HAZARDS OF NAIVE INTERNATIONALISM

As with many dramatic reforms, the Supreme Court of Canada's
general approach to international issues and its application in private international law has limits and dangers. Two general kinds
of problems with policy argumentation - false necessity and excluded objectives - also characterize the internationalist policy
argumentation in the tetralogy. These concerns do not invalidate
the kinds of policy concerns identified in the tetralogy, but they do
complicate the policy analysis or reform prescriptions. The result
is that rarely are there simple, general prescriptions that apply
across fact situations without regard to particular circumstances.
This section of the article will identify several kinds of complicating
considerations for the international analysis of reform in private
international law.
THE APPEAL OF THE COOPERATIVE VISION

I have described the power of policyjustification in international
affairs based on consent and cooperative benefit elsewhere. 18 The
specific idea of building an international order that would ensure
cooperation rather than conflict is central to the project of public
international law. Somehow, through the right combination of laws
and institutions, an international order can be achieved that will
ensure that the potential harmony of interests among states will
be realized. Modern western international law was to play a role
218

See Wai, supranote 169.
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analogous to that of law in the domestic context - to resolve conflicts among sovereign equals and to realize cooperative benefits. 219
The ideal of cooperative benefit accords with popular welfare
criteria in economics and in international relations. Internationalist law reform is argued to satisfy Pareto optimality in that such
220
reforms make no party any worse off than it was before the reform.
Similarly, game theoretic models of international behaviour suggest that in some situations positive-sum gains to both sides are
221
possible through cooperation.
In international relations, the emphasis on cooperative benefit is
especially important because it offers a normative stance that suggests
potentially beneficial controls on state sovereignty, without requiring sacrifice by any state that would render such reform proposals
seemingly unrealistic. This is especially important in international
law because, as Martti Koskenniemi has argued, international law
argumentation operates in the difficult terrain between apology
and utopia. 222 International law discourse must constantly straddle
between the realistic condition of an international system without a
supranational sovereign entity and normative requirements to control sovereign behaviour in the name of global justice and order.
While the focus on inter-jurisdictional cooperative benefit seems
convincing in realms such as the laws of war, there are clearly limits
to what can be addressed and resolved under this rubric. The welfare criterion of cooperative benefit has the drawback of being
unable to address more generally issues of distributive fairness. For
example, baseline distributions between parties are not questioned
nor are the relative shares of cooperative gains. Cooperative benefit
brackets some of the most pressing problems by not taking on diffi223
cult issues of distributive justice, regulation, and human rights.
219 M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structureof InternationalLegalArgu-

ment (Helsinki: Finnish Lawyers' Publishing Company, 1989) at 55-73. Koskenniemi considers the view of the Westphalian Peace as a form of "social contract"
in which the liberal structure of politics was adopted into international relations in Europe (at 73).
220 On the Pareto criteria in welfare economics, see, for example, Trebilcock, supra
note 181 at 7-8.
221 For a survey of rational cooperation models and international law, see D.

Snidal, "Political Economy and International Institutions" (1996) 16 Int'l Rev.
L. and Econ. 12 1.
222 Koskennielni, supra note 219.
223

See Wai, supra note 169 at 235-39 (limits on arguments from cooperative
benefit).
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TWO KINDS OF ERRORS

Partially because of the powerful pull of the cooperative internationalist vision, there is a danger in the tetralogy of a kind of naive
internationalism. Internationalism is too often misunderstood as
a single coherent position. Although internationalist policy objectives such as facilitating international commerce or interstate cooperation are worthwhile goals, there are identifiable gaps between
the policy objectives and particular legal consequences in any particular subject of private international law. In addition, these policy
objectives do not exhaust the range of policy concerns that seem
consistent with an internationalist or cosmopolitan viewpoint in
private international law.
False Necessity
The first kind of critique made in dealing with each of the arguments from commerce, cooperation, and cosmopolitanism focuses
on the gap that exists between such general policy objectives and
the particular institutional or doctrinal reforms that have been
advocated.2 2 4 Inattention to the gap between general internationalist policy goals and particular legal reforms also obscures the
possibility that arguments for commerce, cooperation, and cosmopolitanism may be in conflict with each other rather than being
mutually supportive, as advocates of internationalist reform in private international law tend to assume.
For example, the goal of promoting international cooperation,
with its ideal of cooperation for mutual benefit, is not that useful
to private international law because most of the key issues in private international law involve situations of whatJoseph Singer has

224 This, of course, is a version of the Holmesian dictum from Lochnerv. New York,

198 U.S. 45 at 76 (1905), Holmes J., dissenting, that "[g] eneral propositions
do not decide concrete cases." This general critique of formalist legal reasoning
was a key plank of legal realism. Here, I follow critical legal studies scholars in
applying the dictum to policy reasoning in law; see, for example, D. Kennedy,
"Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication" (1976) 89 Harv. L. Rev.
1685; D. Kennedy, "A Semiotics of Legal Argumentation" (1991) 42 Syracuse
L. Rev. 75; M. Kelman, A Guide to CriticalLegalStudies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1987), c. 4 and 5;J. Singer, "Legal Realism Now" (1988) 76
Cal. L. Rev. 465. For the development of this theme more generally in social theory, see R. Unger, FalseNecessity (London: Verso, 1987).
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view as situalabeled "real conflicts," 22 5 or what economists would
226
tions of choice among Pareto-optimal alternatives.
Similarly, the ideal of cosmopolitan fairness may be convincing
as a general frame for reasoning and judgment in private international law, but the ethical ideal of cosmopolitan justice differs
from, and cannot justify incontrovertibly, an internationalist institutional orientation. It seems clear that moral cosmopolitanism
would reject rules that absolutely refused enforcement of foreign
judgments or that always favoured the forum on questions of
jurisdiction or choice of law. However, forum-oriented rules can
actually favour foreign interests, for example, when foreign laws
or processes are disadvantageous to foreign plaintiffs, or where a
domestic plaintiff seeks to enforce a foreign judgment against the
domestic assets of a foreign defendant. What would a cosmopolitan perspective demand where a court must consider whether to
decline jurisdiction over a tort claim by a foreign plaintiff against a
domestic business defendant? From one view, anti-parochialism
would seem to require that a domestic court should not presumptuously take jurisdiction in a belief that it offers better legal process
than a foreign jurisdiction. In this connection, cosmopolitanism
would demand that assumptions concerning the inferiority, inadequacy, or absence of foreign laws and processes be carefully
examined. 227 From another view, however, cosmopolitan concern
and anti-protectionism suggests that the court should take jurisdiction given that it is a foreign plaintiff who has chosen to make
the claim against a domestic defendant, especially where there
are weaknesses in the foreign jurisdiction's ability or willingness to
protect that plaintiff's interests.
Again, the supposed connection between the goal of promoting international commerce and particular policies, such as rules
promoting certainty and predictability, may be contingent on
specific fact configurations. The indeterminacy of policy recommendations based on efficiency criteria is often underestimated in
25

J.Singer, "Real Conflicts" (1989) 69 Boston Univ. L.Rev. 1.

226See, for example, G. Calabresi, "Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Fur-
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ther" (199 1) 1oo Yale L. J. 1211 ; D. Snidal, "International Political Economy
Approaches to International Institutions," in Bhandari and Sykes, supra note
166 at 485.
A danger especially with respect to developing countries; see, for example, M.
Sornarajah, 'The Myth of International Contract Law" (1981) J. World Trade
187 at 2oo-o0.
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internationalist reform in law. 228 For example, international exchange may not be served by instituting clear and predictable rules
concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of
judgments. What efficiency advocates of clear and predictable rules
fail to consider is that greater enforcement may be a disincentive
for some international transactions. Ex post, it is clear, for example,
that a party that is being sued for breach of contract does not consider greater recognition and enforcement to be in its interest.
As Duncan Kennedy and Frank Michelman observe in the case of
enforcement of contract, "as of the time of the lawsuit, the enforcement of a contract cannotbe said to make both parties better off. If
performance was in the interest of both parties it would normally
occur without enforcement. ''229 An analysis based on transaction
costs might hold that from an ex ante viewpoint both sides would
favour a regime that ensures clear and credible commitments. However, the ex anteappeal of a regime of clear and predictable enforcement might very much depend on what each party believes the
future will hold, in particular, whether the party is the promisor or
the promisee on a commitment and what the likelihood of breach
of the promise is. 230 In some situations, strict enforcement and clear
rules may actually deter transactions.
Excluded InternationalObjectives
In addition to false necessity with respect to particular legal reforms, a second general problem with internationalist policy reasoning is that concerns about commerce, interstate cooperation,
and cosmopolitan fairness do not capture the full range of defensible international objectives. For example, despite the enthusiastic
228

In Bank ofNova Scotiav.Angelica WhitewearLtd., [ 1987] 1 S.C.R. 59, the Supreme
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Court of Canada signalled its awareness of this problem in an international
commercial context involving letters of credit.Justice Le Dain for the court considered whether the use of letters of credit as an important payment mechanism
in international commerce would be advanced by expanding or restricting the
fraud exception to a bank's obligation to pay under a letter of credit.Justice Le
Dain described how, on the one hand, the international commercial use of letters of credit would be harmed by a broad fraud exception that "created serious
uncertainty and lack of confidence in the operation of letter of credit operations," but that, on the other hand, the principle of autonomy of the letter of
credit should not be used to "encourage or facilitate fraud" in international
transactions (at 72).
D. Kennedy and E Michelman, "Are Contract and Property Efficient?" (198o) 8
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Hofstra L. Rev. 711 at 741.
Ibid.
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support for facilitating international commerce in Morguard, the
question of whether commerce should be promoted and in what
form can be queried for defensible cosmopolitan as well as for
domestic reasons. These reasons include considerations of dis2 31
tribution, environmental degradation, and regulatory control.
Moreover, in some contexts, the cosmopolitan or internationalist
position may embrace local control and diversity of domestic
regimes. In the international realm, a commitment to simple international cooperation or to facilitating commerce may not be possible where real conflicts exist in values and interests among states
and among sub-state and transnational interests.
Similarly, the goals of facilitating international commerce and
interstate cooperation suffer from various limits related to their
economistic reasoning. These problems include a state-centric
focus, an under appreciation of non-economic interests, and the
difficulty of defining interests where there are substantial transnational connections and identities. 2 2 Once broader conceptions
of interest are used, the reform implications of internationalization for doctrinal reform become complex and particularistic.
SIX DANGERS IN THINKING ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL

A sophisticated understanding of the international requires recognition of complexity. The international rarely simplifies; it usually adds complexity to analysis. Arguably the Supreme Court of
Canada was engaged, in the tetralogy, in a sophisticated area-byarea focus on reforms informed by, but not overwhelmed by, its
internationalist vision. However, a naive interpretation of the judgments may lead lower courts and some commentators to incorrectly
conclude that there is a single internationalist policy that can be
2 33
routinely or automatically applied to dispose of individual cases.
The next section describes several kinds of errors that seem to
result from the failure to recognize that many internationalist policies do not lead to obvious particular reforms and that there are
a number of different kinds of policy objectives, all of which are
international in their orientation.
231 1 elaborate on the goal of transnational regulation in private international law

in Wai, supranote 168.
232 See Wai, supranote 169 at 236-39.
233

It may be that the expansive application of Morguard,supra note i, to recognition and enforcement of default judgments from non-Canadian jurisdictions
may be an example of this kind of misperception; see Blom, supra note 28.
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InternationalRelations 101 : The Consequences of Anarchy
The theme of comity among courts and among societies is invoked repeatedly in the court's judgments in the tetralogy, as in
its judgments in other areas of law related to international mat-4
23
ters, such as criminal law, extradition, and sovereign immunity.
Informing the principle of comity is the idea that national courts
should give proper respect and deference to foreign interests, values, and institutions so as to promote a better international order.
Canadian courts should adopt a proper respect for the institutions
and interests of foreign jurisdictions in order to encourage cooperative behaviour more generally in the international system. In
addition, the presumptively shared benefits of greater efficiency
in dispute resolution require that deference be shown to foreign
courts and to the choices of parties with respect to forum selection,
arbitration, and choice of law.
From an international relations perspective, however, this view
ignores the basic structure of an anarchic international system: the
lack of an overarching authority that can ensure compliance and
reciprocity on the part of individual participants in that system.2" 5
The game theory models described earlier have as their descriptive
purpose an explanation of how, even in situations of potential
cooperative benefit, it is rational for a state not to cooperate with
others given the lack of a compliance mechanism. In some accounts,
forms of unilateralism and retaliation are sometimes required in
order to get an imperfect form of compliance. In such a realm,
one-sided voluntary internationalism may reward the parochialism
of others and, perversely, harm the long-run benefits of an international order.236 Thus, for example, the willingness of Canadian
courts to be restrained in granting anti-suit injunctions, to decline
jurisdiction forforum non conveniens, and to recognize and enforce
foreign judgments including default judgments may actually encourage jurisdictions such as Texas to refuse to adopt similar
23 7
restraints.
214 I discuss these similarities in Wai, supranote 6.
235 H. Bull, The AnarchicalSociety (London: Macmillan, 1977).
236

See, for example, Trebilcock and Howse, supranote 2 1 3 at 7-9, for a discussion
of this argument in the context of international trade regulation.

237 Effectively, non-reciprocity means abandonment of a "tit-for-tat" strategy that

may actually serve the strategic purpose of achieving a rough form of international cooperation; see Brilmayer, supra note 55 at 184-87.
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To the extent that it addresses the international anarchy at all,
the court in the tetralogy seems to anticipate a strategy of "leading
by example" so as to build up trust and reciprocity and to achieve
cooperative benefits even without effective international institutions. In addition, it seems to rely on the presence of similar values
among foreign adjudicators and legislators, with respect to the laws
and principles of private international law such as comity.
This approach is connected to the tendency in the tetralogy to
elide the federal and the international levels in policy analysis. It
is revealing that three of the cases in the tetralogy involve conflicts among Canadian jurisdictions. In Hunt, indeed, the court
specifically excluded consideration of the international aspect.
However, the underlying policy logic of the cases, and the nature
of the fourth case, Amchem, have suggested to many commentators
and lower courts that the same kinds of reforms were required with
respect to non-Canadian jurisdictions. For example, a large number of cases have applied Morguardto the recognition and enforcement of judgments from non-Canadian jurisdictions, predominantly from the United States. 238 The principle of comity, which is
seen to be central to Morguardand the other cases, has also led
courts to creatively change other doctrines, such as easing the rule
239
against enforcement of foreign public laws.
There are several difficulties with too closely analogizing international relations and federal systems. Most serious is that there are
substantial and fundamental differences in the political and legal
contexts of international and federal systems. Most obviously, without an effective international convention, Canadian courts have
limited ability to directly control or reliably predict the behaviour
of foreign courts or legislatures. In the Canadian federal context,
in contrast, the Supreme Court of Canada, the federal government,
and the other political institutions of the federation permit some
direct control. Therefore, it seems foolish to simply analogize interprovincial and international disputes in the context of controlling
aggressive assumptions of jurisdiction by foreign courts, part of
238 Some lower courts have applied Morguardto international cases of recognition

and enforcement; see, for example, Moses v. Shore Boat Builders Ltd. (1993),
[1994] 1o6 D.L.R. (4 th) 654 (B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused,
[1994] 1 S.C.R. xi [hereinafter Moses]; ArrowmasterIncorporatedv. Unique Forming Ltd. (1993) 17 O.R. ( 3 d) 407 (Gen.Div.). See, generally, Blom, supra note
28; Sullivan, supra note 16.
239 For example, United Statesv. Ivey, (1995) 26 O.R. ( 3 d) 533 at 549, citing the
principle of comity from Morguardin support of reform of the rule.
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the function of both restrictions on recognition and enforcement
ofjudgments as in Morguardand anti-suit injunctions as in Amchem.
A basic understanding of international relations would highlight
this point. In the absence of any overarching authority, there is only
an indirect hope for comity and reciprocal restraint by foreign
jurisdictions.
Furthermore, the assumptions about convergence in values
among differentjurisdictions that inform the tetralogy and that are
most evident in the Tolofson judgment may apply very differently
within the Canadian federation as compared to between Canadian
and foreign jurisdictions. A liberal theory of international relations might argue that a private international law among liberal
jurisdictions should be much more harmonious and comitious
because the underlying values represented in both the substance
and processes of law should be similar.240 This assumption, however, is less than determinative for the purposes of private international law. Convergence on some basic political values does not
obviously or necessarily translate into greater convergence in legal
regimes nor greater accommodation in practice. After all, many
conflict of laws disputes are generated by disputes between Canadian provinces, which share nearly identical liberal political values,
and yet legal differences that matter to private law disputes continue, as in the differences over the passenger laws of Saskatchewan
and British Columbia in the Tolofson case. The divergences are still
greater with many of our liberal neighbours in the United States the source of most of the private international law disputes that
Canadian courts will face. Significant differences in societal values
and legal rules exist between Canadian and US jurisdictions on
major issues such as gun control, affirmative action, and the death
penalty. 241 These differences extend to private law and private
procedure, especially in so far as private law performs functions
of social regulation. The final part of this article contains a more
240

Slaughter, supra note 138.

241 In this connection, it is interesting in this respect to compare the majority

Supreme Court of Canadajudgments with respect to extradition to the United
States to face the potential death penalties in Kindler,supranote 1 18, and Re Ng
Extradition,supra note i 18, which were written by a court contemporaneously
generating the tetralogy in private international law. In contrast, the recent
judgment in United States v. Burns, supra note 119, may indicate a rethinking at
the court concerning the nature of its internationalism in the criminal law area.
For an argument concerning some of the shared characteristics of the extradition cases and the tetralogy in private international law, see Wai, supra note 6.
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extended discussion of this concern using the example of punitive
damages.
Real Conflicts and the Sacrifice of Domestic State Interests
A weak appreciation of the consequences for cooperation of a
fundamentally different structure of an international anarchy is
worsened when an internationalist approach fails to appreciate
that significantjurisdictional interests may sometimes be at stake in
private litigation across borders. For example, a policy of comity
with respect to foreign state processes and laws is a potential problem if domestic interests are too readily sacrificed. While the US
governmental-interest analysis of choice of law problems may often
overstate the state legislative interest in private law disputes, there
are occasions when a state's interests in having the level of regulatory protection of, for example, its tort laws could be jeopardized
by deference to a foreign court's assumption of jurisdiction or
through a decision to apply foreign law rather than forum law. This
is especially a concern if regulatory preferences are understood to
include not only the decision to set a high standard of regulatory protection but also to set a lower standard based on balancing a number of different interests and policies.2 42 Comity in this
situation may undermine the complex political and normative
settlements that underpin the regulatory structure of a Canadian
jurisdiction.
The Hunt decision evidences the manner in which private international law disputes may raise issues that are of significant legislative and social concern. The Quebec blocking statute, which was
held to be inapplicable, was legislation that specifically identified
out-of-province and outside-of-Canada asbestos litigation as being
problematic for the public policy of Quebec. With respect to this
issue, the Quebec National Assembly presumably was concerned
with a range of interests, including those of the workers in the Qu&
bec asbestos industry. To prioritize international system objectives,
such as the promotion of international trade or the cosmopolitan
fairness to litigants, is to overturn this legislative determination.
Similarly, the liberal recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments rendered against Canadian defendants might constitute
a significant additional cost for Canadian businesses. This is a problem if the assessment of the quality of the connection of the foreign
242 Singer,

supra note

225 at 41.
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court to the dispute is too deferential. Moreover, since comity and
cooperation, not reciprocity or a binding international treaty, are
the guiding principles, there is no way to ensure that the foreign
jurisdictions are treating Canadian judgments in the same way.
Similar concerns exist with respect to the policy set out in Amchem
of discouraging the use of anti-suit injunctions.
Unfairness to Individuals
A further concern about the internationalist approach in the
tetralogy is that in adopting an international focus, the court both
overstated the importance of private international law to interstate
cooperation and understated the importance of private international law to individual parties. The consequence is an approach
that departs from the traditional focus of Canadian private international law on fairness to the parties and moves instead towards
the protection of systemic goals such as ensuring cooperative interstate order and facilitating interstate commerce.
Traditional private international law in Canada, in contrast to US
governmental-interest analysis, has not emphasized the significance
to state interests of most kinds of private international law disputes.
Private international legal disputes are often relatively minor from
the point of view of states, and military conflict or trade wars are
not real consequences of private international law disputes. As Max
Rheinstein notes, "[n] ever in private law is there a conflict between
states in the sense in which states clash on questions of boundary,
treatment of foreign nationals or property, or spheres of interest."2 43 One view would be, therefore, that the court's internationalist approach is a sensible trade-off of some limited state interests
for the benefits of encouraging the state interests in international
order, international commerce, and anti-parochialism.
This emphasis on international system concerns and objectives
would not be a problem if state interests were the only matter at
hand. Private international law in the Commonwealth traditions,
however, has traditionally focused on the conflicts between the
interests and preferences of individual parties. A significant danger
in promoting international system objectives is that the interests
and values of individual parties are dealt with unfairly. This concern about the consequences of focusing away from individuals
2

M. Rheinstein, "How to Review a Festschrift" (1962) 1 1 Am.J. Comp. L. 632 at
664, quoted in F Juenger, Choice of Law and MultistateJustice(Boston: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1993) at 161, n. 997.
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and onto states is what has undermined English support for the
doctrine of comity.2 4 4 Before the tetralogy, Canadian courts followed the English courts in de-emphasizing state interests and
attempting to develop private international law rules based on the
characteristics of different categories of relations among individual
litigants.
The sacrifice of individual fairness is a major problem in a liberal
interpretation of the rules from the tetralogy. Generous and liberal
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments may assist in
predictability and in interstate relations, but it may be unfair to a
defendant who has formulated expectations ofjustice based on its
various connections to a Canadian jurisdiction and a foreign jurisdiction. Similarly, the use of a rigid lex loci delicti rule assists in
promoting predictability and in protecting against parochialism in
choice of law in tort. However, the unfairness to individual litigants
can be very high, and it can be argued that in Tolofson, Justice La
Forest and the court may have become too focused on systemic
objectives at the cost of fairness to the plaintiffs whose substantive
claim failed because of the ruling. The idea that as between order
and fairness "order comes first" 245 is to overstate the importance of
certainty to order and the importance of order itself. Some degree
of conflict can be managed in transnational civil litigation without
serious losses to the system; in comparison, unfairness to individuals caused by false suppression of conflict can be substantial. It is
for this reason that Jean-Gabriel Castel, reasserting the values of
the traditional private international law approach, argues that "[i] f
246
a choice must be made, fairness should prevail over order."
Disturbingthe Laws and Politics of Federalism
I noted earlier that the tetralogy evidences a strong and dangerous tendency to analogize the international to the federal, even
244 See Dicey & Morris, supra note 92 at 5-6:

[1]t is clear that English courts apply e.g. French law in order to do justice
between the parties, and not from any desire to show courtesy to the
French Republic, nor even in the hope that if English courts apply French
law in appropriate cases, French courts will be encouraged in appropriate
cases to apply English law.
2"

The authors' choice of France for their example is of interest.
Tolofson, supranote i at 1o58.

246 Castel, supranote io at 67.
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where the basic institutional features of the two levels are different.
There is a further danger connected with too closely identifying the
international and the federal in policy reasoning: the disturbance
of established and functioning federal systems of governance. The
tetralogy demonstrates a fascinating connection between changing
international realities and issues of Canadian federalism. Justice
La Forest, for example, the leading judge at the court in the tetralogy and in international law more generally, was also a leading
expert on federalism, both as an academic2 47and as ajudge.2 41 The
tetralogy - particularly its ideas about the constitutional limits on
provincial jurisdiction, the Canadian common market, and the significance of mobility rights - provides a powerful vision of a federation in need of reform to suit both Canadian and international
realities. 249 At the policy level, the tetralogy emphasizes the close
connection between federal and international analyses in that the
Supreme Court of Canada and lower courts have almost interchangeably identified a process of increasing commerce, mobility,
and convergence in values in both federal and international societies and argued for similar legal responses in both venues. The
potential hazards of reforms to federalism posed by the tetralogy
have been somewhat obscured because the effective mode of internationalization has been by policy consciousness rather than by
formal implementation of international treaties.
Internationalization through the mode of international treaties
can pose serious challenges for the division of powers in federal
states. In the law and politics of Canadian federalism, the federal
treaty implementation power has been a frequent source of contention between those who advocate the need for a federal state to
act in a unified way on the international plane and those who
believe that an expansive federal treaty implementation power
247

G.V. La Forest, The Allocation of the Taxing Power under the CanadianConstitution,

2nd ed. (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1981); G.V. La Forest, Natural
Resources andPublicProperty under the CanadianConstitution (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1969). In an early article,Justice La Forest made the connection between the constitutional law of federalism and international law; G.V. La
Forest, "May the Provinces Legislate in Violation of International Law?" (1 9 61)
39 Can. Bar Rev. 78.
241 See, for example, R. v. Crown ZellerbachCanadaLtd., [ 1988] 1 S.C.R. 401, La For-

241

estJ. dissenting; Air Canada v. B.C., [ 1989] 1 S.C.R. 1161; Friends of the Oldman
River Society v. Canada, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 3; Ontario Hydro v. Ontario (LabourRelations), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 327.
See McEvoy, supra note 23.
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effectively undermines provincial powers.2 50 More recently, international trade treaties, such as the WTO agreements 251 and the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),252 create complex
issues related to the law and politics of federal states. 253 The tetralogy never directly addresses the issue of the treaty implementation
power, but the judgments do effectively constrain provincial jurisdiction since most private law and, consequently, most private
international law is within provincial jurisdiction. In Morguard,the
court found constraints on courts applying provincial common
law with respect to the recognition and enforcement ofjudgments
from other provinces; lower courts have extended this reasoning
to judgments from non-Canadian jurisdictions. In Hunt, the court
prevented provincial legislatures from impeding trans-provincial
litigation by constitutionalizing certain limits on provincial jurisdiction in the area of private international law. The court did not
elaborate on these limits and expressly did not rule on whether
there are any limits on provincial legislatures on private interna254
tional law matters with respect to non-Canadian jurisdictions,
but it seems clear that this decision amounts to a constitutional
limit on provincial legislative jurisdiction, which had not formerly
been articulated and which has almost as much impact as the imple2 55
mentation of a formal international treaty
250

A.G. Can. v. A.G. Ont. (LabourConventions), [1937] A.C. 326. For the debates

about the treaty implementation power, see Hogg, supra note 115 at c. 1 1; G.V.
La Forest and Associates, Water Law in Canada: The Atlantic Provinces (Ottawa:
Information Canada, 1973) at 63-68.
251 For example, GATT, supra note 212 at Article XXIV( 12).
252

NAFTA, supra note 187.

251See, for example, D.

214

Wirth, "Government by Trade Agreement," in D.
Dallmeyer, ed., Joining Together Standing Apart: NationalIdentities after NAFTA
(The Hague: Kluwer, 1997) 111 at 124-25. The impact of international trade
treaties on not only issues of federal-state relations but also municipal government is demonstrated clearly by the recent arbitral award of the tribunal constituted pursuant to Chapter i of the NAFTA in Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico
(Arbitration Award, August 30, 2ooo) and the judicial review of that award,
Mexicov. Metalclad Corp., [2001] B.CJ. 950 (BC Supreme Court, May 2, 2oo).
Hunt, supra note i.

255Another example of the indirect impact of internationalization on federal rela-

tions is seen in the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Ward v.
Canada (Attorney General), 2002 S.C.C. 17, where the court considered whether
federal legislation restricting the trade in seal and seal products fell within the
federal fisheries power tinder section 91 (12) of the Constitution Act, 1867,
supra note 24, or fell instead within provincial powers over property and civil
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There are several points to make about these increased constraints placed on provincial legislatures and courts. First, many of
the other concerns about the reforms in the name of the international also apply with respect to reforms done in the name of the
federal in an era of the international. There are significant differences between the two levels; for example, the federal government
and the Supreme Court of Canada have an oversight role that differs from the formally anarchic relations between sovereign states.
However, as with the international context, there remain significant differences in social and legal values among provinces, provincial laws often reflect policy compromises developed to suit local
communities, and reform to suit federal relations may overlook
fairness to individuals whose expectations may be linked to provincial laws and processes.
Second, it is important to remember the central concern of the
difficult debate over the treaty implementation power, which is that
merely because a matter has international dimensions does not
mean that legislative jurisdiction should be automatically removed
from the local levels of government. Within Europe, the debates
about subsidiarity have emphasized the costs associated with removing policy-making to higher and more distant levels of government. This lesson, of course, is a major theme of the Canadian
constitutional law on the federal division of powers.
Finally, the rules that should apply to the conflict of laws among
Canadian jurisdictions might be different from the rules that
should apply with respect to non-Canadian jurisdictions. It seems
clear that Canadian jurisdictions should be careful in simply
extending the same treatment given to other Canadian jurisdictions to foreign jurisdictions under principles such as those provided in Morguard.Still more clearly, the unanswered question in
Hunt, concerning whether there are constitutional limitations on
the power of provincial legislatures with respect to non-Canadian
jurisdictions, should be answered so as to permit provincial legislatures significant room to choose their private international law
rules with respect to non-Canadian jurisdictions. This flexibility

rights under section 92(13). In characterizing the legislation, the court
referred to the desire of the federal government to respond to concerns about
international sales boycotts of seal and other fisheries products as relevant to
its characterization of the federal legislation as being in pith and substance
concerned with matters of management and control of the fisheries. Ibid. at
paras. 2, 8, and 2 1.
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concerning constitutional limits is needed to temper the existing
effects of internationalist reform on the federal division of powers,
to account for the problem of oversight and divergence in values
with non-Canadian jurisdictions, and for reasons of deference to
legislatures in international matters - a matter that will be discussed in the next section.
Constitutionalizationand Legislatures,Executives, and the Courts
As was noted earlier, the lack of an effective overarching institutional authority in international matters means that real conflicts
develop between sovereign entities that cannot be resolved in a
determinative fashion. Instead, many international disputes are resolved, if at all, through extended processes of international negotiation and compromise.256 While similar kinds of enforcement
difficulties arise in domestic disputes, there are still substantial differences in degree between the two contexts.
An awareness of workable political process in international relations requires an awareness of the relative strengths and drawbacks of various institutional alternatives. National courts without
enforcement power outside their jurisdiction are usually not the
best political institutions for dealing with international conflict.
For example, national courts are neither authorized nor able to
directly negotiate with foreign jurisdictions, to engage in ongoing
negotiation and monitoring, to link issues to create the possibility
of larger compromises, and to engage in broader consultations
with affected domestic constituencies as negotiations proceed. All
of these arguments are familiar policy concerns, which inform the
traditional deference of common law courts to the executive
branch on international matters, which is evident in doctrines such
as sovereign immunity2 57 and in the Crown prerogative to conduct
2 58
international relations.

256 Even within the more "legalistic" processes established in international insti-

tutions such as the WTO, dispute resolution retains significant 'pragmatic"
elements; see, generally, G. R. Shell, "Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization" (1995) 44 Duke
L.J. 829.
257 See S. Williams and A.L.C. de Mestral, An Introduction to International Law:
Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied in Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths,
1987) c. 8.
258 See Hogg, supra note 1 15 at sections 1.8, 11.2, and 1 1.3.
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In the tetralogy, the court seems to move away from this deference in the realm of private international law. In this respect,
Canadian courts should take a lesson from Justice La Forest's work
in other areas, which emphasizes the limits of national courts as
an effective institution in the international context.25 9 This sense
of limits of national courts has led him to argue, for example, for
deference to the executive and legislative branches in the application of the Charter in almost all international matters. First, some
Charter rights were modified for the international context. For
example, Justice La Forest emphasized that the scope of Charter
review does not extend to the review of foreign proceedings for
260
problems such as unreasonable delay or inadequate counsel. Second, Justice La Forest's approach to the justification of infringement under section i of the Charter gave significant discretion to
the political and executive branches of the Canadian government
to take into account the numerous considerations that might be at
261
play in legal disputes with an international aspect.
The deferential approach adopted by Justice La Forest in the
Charter context seems to contrast sharply with the constitutional
limits on provincial courts and legislatures in private international
law articulated in the tetralogy. Particularly in the Hunt decision,
Justice La Forest seemed to signal that the room for provincial legislatures to set private international law rules that are not in keeping with the basic norms of comity will be tightly controlled. While
the degree of deference to the legislative and executive branch in
the Charter context might be too statist and deferential on some
international matters, such as extradition, the degree of internationalist activism demonstrated in the tetralogy at times seems too
interventionist.
It may be that since private international law is an area predominantly developed by common law courts, Justice La Forest was less
concerned with the problems of a lack of institutional competence.
Given little evidence that legislatures were intending to legislate in
259 In Wai, supra note 6, I compare and contrast the lack of deference in the tetral-

ogy with (1) Justice La Forest's legal realist take on the limited effectiveness of
adjudication in comparison to legislative, executive and administrative
processes; (2) his generally deferential attitude towards the legislative and executive branches in the application of the Charter; and (3) his restricted idea of
the role of national courts in other international areas, such as in extradition.

0 Canadav. Schmidt, supra note 18; R. v. Harrer,[19951 3 S.C.R. 562.
261 United Statesv. Cotroni; United States v. ElZein, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469 at 1487-90.

Annuaire canadien de Droit international2oo
private international law to institute international reforms, it fell
to the courts to promote such reform. None of these arguments,
however, overcomes the concern that with respect to international
reform more recognition is needed of the traditional limits of common law courts in international matters.
This concern is most problematic in the implications of constitutionalization for the ability of provincial courts and legislatures
to tailor their reforms to the complex process of policy involving
foreign jurisdictions. In some areas, such as in the blocking statute
deliberately constructed by the provincial legislature with respect
to asbestos litigation in Hunt or in legislation such as clawback
statutes in antitrust, it seems clear that the legislative branch has
spoken and should be given wide discretion to tailor domestic laws
for political exigencies, including extended or failed international
negotiations. In light of the institutional disadvantages of the common law courts, it makes some sense to restrictively interpret the
constitutionalization of the rules of the tetralogy at least with respect to non-Canadian jurisdictions. In Hunt, for example, the
court expressly did not address the issue of whether the blocking
statute would be constitutionally inapplicable with respect to litigation proceeding in non-Canadian jurisdictions. Given the different
institutional structures, as well as the lack of relative institutional
competence of the courts in foreign affairs, 262 the constitutional
limits on provincial legislatures should be less restrictive with
respect to non-Canadian jurisdictions than with respect to other
Canadian provinces. 263 In Tolofson, Justice La Forest signalled that
the rigid lex loci delicti rule might permit exceptions for "injustice,
264
in certain circumstances," although he thought they would be few.
It may be that significant differences in the underlying tort law and
the choice of law rules in tort between Canadian and non-Canadian
jurisdictions, including USjurisdictions, might mean that Canadian
courts and particularly Canadian legislatures should be permitted
to vary the rule.

262

Justice La Forest notes in Hunt, supranote 1 at 328, that the federal Parliament

is expressly permitted by the constitution to legislate with international
extraterritorial effect; see Statute of Westminster, 193 1 (U.IK), 22 Geo.V, c.4, s. 3:
"It is hereby declared and enacted that the Parliament of a Dominion has full
power to make laws having extra-territorial operation."
263 Hunt, supra note i at 331.
264 Tolofson, supranote 1 at 1054.
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Overlooked InternationalObjectives
In addition to harms to individual, local, and federal interests
and policies, the concern to promote international commerce and
interstate relations may lead Canadian courts to ignore other
important international objectives, such as effective international
regulation or distributive justice across state borders. For example,
internationalist reform may overlook the function of private international law in assisting the regulatory oversight of transnational
businesses.2 65 Internationalist policy argumentation tends to promote court respect for party autonomy in the choice of disputeresolution by forum selection, choice of law, and arbitration clauses.
However, this approach may fail to identify appropriately the regulatory challenges posed by this "lift-off' of transnational business
from state-based private law regulation. As in the domestic realm,
the courts are part of a complex mix of institutional processes,
both governmental and non-governmental. Courts may provide a
more accessible point of access for groups or individuals than
either legislative or executive processes. In view of the increasing
concern that key areas of social control are slipping away into
international bureaucracies and global markets, it may be necessary to critically and creatively re-evaluate or limit the institutional
deference of national courts to other domestic, foreign, and international institutions.
In the final part of this article, I will attempt to explore how concerns such as effective transnational regulation can be better incorporated into a policy approach to private international law that
acknowledges complexity and the existence of plural objectives.
PART

6: Two

EXAMPLES OF PARTICULARISTIC AND CONTEXTUAL

INTERNATIONALIST POLICY ANALYSIS

It has been argued that considerations of the international rarely
simplify, and frequently make more complex, legal determinations
in private international law. The response must be that general policy concerns such as international commerce, interstate cooperation, and cosmopolitan fairness identify valuable concerns, but
that other international and domestic policy goals must be consid2 66
ered. Particularism and context will therefore matter very much.
265

1 argue this in Wai, supranote 168.

266 For example, in Wai, supranote 16 9 , I argue that the commercial activity excep-

tion to sovereign immunity lacks necessary particularism. This is particularly
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This need not lead to hopelessly fact-specific determinations. The
internationalist policy objectives, together with others, help to identify dimensions of concern that will help to structure argumentation
and decision in particular cases. 267 In this respect, private international law already contains complex doctrines such as ddpeage,
under which different national laws might apply to different aspects
of one relation or transaction. 28 In a pragmatic or eclectic framework, this principle might extend as well to tailoring applicable
laws and procedures for the structural features of different kinds of
disputes, such as the nature of the foreign jurisdiction involved in
the problem. The ability to address complexity and real conflicts
with an orderly framework for argumentation and decision-making
is key to private international law. In order to show how this kind of
contextual analysis might operate in Canadian private international
law, this section concludes the article with some international policy
analysis of two contrasting examples: jurisdiction over Canadian
corporations conducting business in developing economies, and
the recognition and enforcement of US punitive damages awards.
JURISDICTION, FORUM NON CONVENIENS, CANADIAN COURTS,
AND CANADIAN CORPORATIONS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD

In Amchem, the Supreme Court of Canada promoted the use of
forum non conveniens as a vehicle for the rational allocation of jurisdiction and the promotion of comity in inter-jurisdictional relations. There are many virtues to the doctrine, and it has been
adopted in a number of non-Canadian jurisdictions as well. However, there are also dangers. In particular, there is a danger in considering whether there is forum non conveniens of a lapse into naive
internationalism through an excessive concern with comity and
procedural efficiency. Such concern with comity and efficiency
may be inappropriate in a context where the litigation is directed
problematic when, on the one hand, a broad exception to sovereign immunity
has been taken with respect to commercial activity and, on the other hand, the
immunity rule has been applied broadly with respect to almost all other kinds of
activity, including activity involving human rights abuses.
267 For a model of this "pragmatic" approach in the US conflict of laws, seeJ. Singer,
"A Pragmatic Guide to Conflicts" (1990) 70 Boston Univ. L. Rev. 73 1.
268 Under d~pefage,various state laws may govern different aspects of a "single" business relationship, for example, different laws may apply sales, transportation,
and credit aspects. See, for example, Rome Convention, supra note 83, articles
3 (1) and 4 (1); Castel et al., supra note 7 1 at 17 1.
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against a Canadian corporation conducting business abroad in a
developing country. In this context, a Canadian court may require
a more nuanced sense of (1) the problem of effective transnational
regulation where the other potential jurisdictions for the litigation
have weak or non-existent regulatory protection and (2) the need
to protectjustice and fairness for the foreign plaintiff.
A more sophisticated and contextual understanding of the international system would recognize the need to assess differentially
jurisdictional issues related to attempts to sue Western multinational enterprises in their home jurisdictions for claims related to
their operation abroad in developing economies. Canadian courts
that focus narrowly on the convenience of litigation may decline
jurisdiction with the consequence of injustice to foreign plaintiffs,
under-regulation in the transnational system, and even a form of
inadvertent parochialism. In the most prominent example of such
a case since the tetralogy, a Quebec court used forum non conveniens
analysis to grant a stay of proceedings in Quebec courts against a
Quebec-based mining company accused of causing environmental
damage in a cyanide spill at one of its mines in Guyana.2 69 The case
recalled the decision of the New York courts to decline jurisdiction
for reasons of forum non conveniens in litigation by Indian plaintiffs
against Union Carbide for the Bhopal chemical factory accident in
India.27 0
The Quebec court in Recherches InternationalesQuibec v. Cambior
Inc.271 seemed especially concerned to emphasize the need for
269 RecherchesInternationalesQufbecv. CambiorInc., [1998]

QJ. No.

2554 (Quebec

Superior Court, August 14, 1998) [hereinafter Cambior]. For an extended commentary, see S. Seck, "Environmental Harm in Developing Countries Caused
by Subsidiaries of Canadian Mining Corporations: The Interface of Public and
Private International Law" (1999) 37 Can. YB. Int'l L. 139.
270 Re Union CarbideCorporationGas PlantDisaster at Bhopal, India in December,1984,
634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y 1986), aff'd 8o9 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Union Carbide]. The Second Circuit ruled that a suit against Union Carbide by Indian victims and the Indian government of the Bhopal chemical
disaster was forum non conveniens in the New York courts and should be heard
in the courts of India. This conclusion was reached in spite of the submissions
of the Indian government who agreed that the suit was better heard in the US
court. The court did impose a number of conditions on its stay, including that
Union Carbide consent to submit to the broad discovery under the US Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. For critical commentary, see U. Baxi, Inconvenient
Forum and Convenient Catastrophe:The Bhopal Case (Delhi and Bombay: Indian
Law Institute and N.M. Tripathi, 1986); Paul, supra note 145 at 6 1-2.
2

Cambior supranote 269.
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comity and due respect for the courts of Guyana, focusing on evidence as to the procedural effectiveness of the Guyanese courts.
This reinforced the other main concern of its analysis, namely issues
of procedural advantage such as proximity to the accident site and
to relevant witnesses.
While the relative connections of the action to Quebec and
Guyana can be debated, the court might have factored in a concern
with effective transnational regulation as an international policy
objective, which is as important as interstate cooperation and comity
or procedural efficiencies. These regulatory concerns arise both at
the international level and the domestic level. At the international
level, it may be that there are systemic problems of under-regulation
of transnational business conduct. With weak international-level
regulatory authorities, regulatory gaps with respect to externalities
created by transnational business actors often fail to be regulated
by an imperfectly coordinated set of sovereign authorities. In some
cases, a process of regulatory competition may worsen the regulatory problem as states compete to attract economic production by
mobile transnational business actors through reductions of domestic regulatory levels below levels that would otherwise be chosen by
272
those societies.
There may also be substantial reasons for a Canadian court to
consider the challenges for developing countries in creating and
implementing an effective regime of domestic regulation of business conduct. In the Cambiorcase, there was little sign that effective
environmental regulation was in place. Likewise, the tort laws related to environmental damage were weak and not well suited to the
scale of the mining or to the size and resources of the transnational
defendant. In contrast, Canadian courts are very familiar with both
the public and private law regulation of mining companies and
their operations. Moreover, in the surrounding support for such
litigation, the Canadian jurisdiction may offer significant advantages, including better support services, better access to experts,
and superior non-governmental organization support. This is not
to argue that developing economies always lack effective legal systems, only to argue that a court may need to consider more broadly
273
what effectiveness would amount to in a particular litigation.
272 I discuss regulatory gaps and regulatory competition as problems of interna-

tional cooperation in private international law in Wai, supra note 168 at 250-58.
273The recent House of Lords decision in Lubbev. Cape plc, [2000] 4 All E.R. 268
(H.L.), consideredforum non conveniens, but in its application permitted South
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In both Re Union Carbide Corporation Gas PlantDisasterat Bhopal,
India in December, 1984274 and Cambior, the courts used an internationalist rhetoric of comity where arguably no real issue of comity
was present and where substantial policy goals would have been
served by the assumption of jurisdiction. In Union Carbide, comity
concerns seemed especially improbable given that the Indian government expressly did not object to the assumption ofjurisdiction
by the New York court over the litigation. In Cambior, the Guyan275
ese government neither objected nor promoted the litigation.
This should not be surprising given that governments may want
to appear neutral so as not to alarm current or future foreign
investors or to invite more general incursions of foreign courts into
76
other domestic matters.1
Policy arguments related to cosmopolitan fairness and antiparochialism in the Cambior case would seem to operate against,
rather than for, applyingforum non conveniens in this case. It is hard
to see how it can be anti-parochial to reject the preferences of foreign plaintiffs and instead observe the preferences of a defendant
with strong Canadian connections. Indeed, by declining jurisdiction, the court is open to the accusation that it fed into perceived
Canadian economic interests.
Neither do arguments based on individual fairness to the Canadian defendant seem especially strong. Canadian corporations and
their legal advisors are familiar with the Canadian legal process even more so than with the processes of a foreign jurisdiction.
While such corporations will not necessarily be held to the same
standards as at home, they should have some expectation of possible legal challenges based in Canadian courts. Moreover, as
assumption of jurisdiction is not the same as choice of law, a
Canadian court may still choose to apply the foreign law even after

African plaintiffs to continue with their litigation in English courts against an
English parent company for personal injuries related to exposure to asbestos.
This decision may be an example of greater sensitivity to the particular procedural problems that may impede litigants in the legal systems of some developing countries.
274

Union Carbide,supra note

171

Comity concerns make more sense where governments take

270.
2

position that

domestic processes are sufficient.
276 On the difficult position of developing countries with respect to international
legalism in a global context of neoliberalism and neoimperialism, see Wai,
supranote 169 at 241-45.
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assuming jurisdiction. And, in any event, the foreign plaintiff must
still overcome the substantial challenges and costs of proving its
case in a Canadian trial. Most important, as Sara Seck argues,
Canada should take some responsibility for the action abroad of
the significant number of leading multinational mining and oil and
gas corporations based in Canada.2 77 These kinds of operations
generate significant environmental and health risks and frequently
operate in developing economies that often lack significant experience with such operations. A Canadian commitment to responsible
internationalism and governance is challenged if there is no effort
to take some responsibility in sectors where Canadian business
actors are among the most important transnational actors. The
allegations against the Talisman oil company of human rights problems related to its oil operations in Sudan are another high-profile
example where a Canadian court, faced with a private suit, might
be tempted to use forum non conveniens analysis without considera27 8
tion of broader international contexts.
Transnational tort actions involving developing economies may
require a different analysis of questions ofjurisdiction. In contrast,
there may be no reason to be concerned about effective regulation
or legal protections with respect to a transnational tort action relating to the United States for reasons such as the basic public regulatory structures in place, the generally protective purpose of US tort
law, the highly developed tort-litigation process, and the economic
and political power of the United States in Canada. Indeed, such
differences in context might argue for a very different treatment
of some Canadian private international law rules with respect to
American jurisdictions, as I will attempt to illustrate in the next
section.
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS:
THE EXAMPLE OF US PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDS

A developing and important issue in the recognition and enforcement of judgments concerns punitive damage awards from the
United States. This issue is an example where a Canadian court, following the internationalist policy orientation in the tetralogy, may
7 Seck, supranote 269.
278 With respect to the complaints concerning Talisman, see, for example, Human

SecuritT in Sudan: The Report of a CanadianAssessment Mission, prepared by John
Harker for the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Ottawa, January 2000).
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miss important specific concerns of state interests and individual
fairness.27 9
The Morguardcase involved two Canadian jurisdictions. Although
the court identified some distinctively Canadian factors to reinforce its judgment, the basic rationale for the decision was the
functional needs of an increasingly interdependent international
system and the guiding principle of comity. A number of lower
courts have followed this reasoning and applied the Morguardprinciples to permit recognition and enforcement of judgments from
non-Canadian judgments.28 ° In Moses v. Shore Boat Builders Ltd.,
for example, the British Columbia Court of Appeal applied the
Morguard rule to a default judgment of an Alaskan court against a
British Columbia defendant. 28 ' This approach has been supported
by some academic commentators who have observed that the comity
arguments in the Morguard case would apply internationally as
well as interprovincially and that: "[a] 11 aspects of international or
interprovincial conflict of laws should be subjected to the same limitation: that there must exist a real and substantial connection to
the forum for it to take jurisdiction or to apply its own law, and to
have its judgments recognized elsewhere. 282 Yet with respect to US
judgments, a number of concerns arise. Lord Denning expressed
these concerns most colourfully in his observation that "[a]s a
moth to the light, so a litigant is drawn to the United States. If he
283
can only get his case into their courts, he stands to win a fortune.
Among the many concerns expressed by Lord Denning with respect to US civil litigation, the availability of punitive damages in
279 A significant recent example of a related debate in the Canada-US context con-

280

cerns the willingness of Canadian courts perhaps too readily to "complement,
coordinate and where appropriate accommodate the proceedings" of US
courts in cross-border insolvencies; see Re Babcock & Wilcox CanadaLtd., (2ooo)
18 C.B.R. ( 4 th) 157 (Ont. S.CJ. [Commercial List]) at para 9. It evidences the
importance of the tetralogy in Canadian law that Justice Farley, the leading
judge in Ontario on matters related to cross-border insolvencies, invoked
Morguardin his judgment in Babcock and in previous judgments as providing a
strong policy support for extending the practice of comity to the international
context and to the context of cross-border insolvencies. For critical commentary, see, for example, J. Ziegel, "Corporate Groups and Canada-US Crossborder Insolvencies: ContrastingJudicial Visions" (2000) 25 C.B.R. (4 th) 16 1.
See Blom, supra note 28, for a survey of cases.

281

Moses, supra note 238.

282 Castel, supra note io at 66.
283 SmithKline &French LaboratoriesLtd. v. Bloch (1983), 2 All E.R. 72 at 74 (C.A.).
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combination with jury trials and contingent fee agreements seems
to figure foremost.
Under the internationalist interpretation of the Morguard ruling, it would seem that because of the concerns of comity, Canadian courts have little basis on which to conduct detailed reviews
of the punitive damages components of US judgments so long as
the jurisdiction in question has a real and substantial connection
to the matter in dispute. Moreover, such refusals would seem to be
an unacceptable parochialism given that Canadian courts also
award punitive damages. 2 4 However, the argument for liberalized
recognition and enforcement of judgments is based on a general
convergence in underlying substantive regimes, and the need for
international cooperation ignores the degree to which genuine,
and relevant, private law conflicts regularly occur between jurisdictions that have similar underlying laws. More attention must be
paid to the particular kind of conflict typically in dispute in private
international law. Most private international law disputes are not
a threat to international system-level concerns. For individual litigants, however, such disputes do involve serious issues of distributive fairness.
The broad emphasis on international cooperation inadequately
captures what practically speaking amounts to a substantial policy
disagreement between Canadian and American jurisdictions concerning punitive damages policy. The mere shared classification of
damages as punitive damages disguises the degree to which substantial differences exist in Canada on the quantum of such damages.
For most practical purposes, substantial disputes about differences
in quantum are as important as disputes about liability.28 5 The
2 Canadian courts may award exemplary damages in tort law and, more rarely, in
contract; see S. Waddams, The Law of Damages (Toronto: Canada Law Book,
1997) at paras. 11.250-11.26o. The recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada in Whiten v. PilotInsurance Co., 2oo2 S.C.C. 18, signals that substantial
punitive damages may be available, although -very much the exception rather
than the rule" (para. 94), in breach of contract cases in Canada. It is interesting
that the court considered submissions concerning the excesses of the US experience with punitive damages in the course of its evaluation of what Canadian
law on the issue should be (paras. 6o-65).
281 The court in Tolofson, supra note i at 1059 did not seem to appreciate this; it
considered that general convergence in liability principles with respect to guest
passenger statutes had diminished public policy problems because only differences in quantum remained. In Kidron v. Grean, (1999) 48 O.R. (3d) 775
(Gen.Div.), leave to appeal refused 48 O.R. ( 3 d) 784, Justice Brennan suggested a more cautious approach to the recognition and enforcement of a
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significant differences in damage awards could amount to a transfer of resources from one jurisdiction to another. More importantly, the differences may cause hardship to particular defendants
who may have acted in reliance on reasonable expectations that
did not include potential exposure to such punitive damage awards
enforceable in their home jurisdictions.
The quantum of punitive damages in the United States has
raised concerns among many of the states engaged in negotiations
for a multilateral convention on recognition and enforcement
of judgments.28 6 National courts have also been reluctant to give
recognition and enforcement to such awards. In an important 1992
decision, for example, the German Bundesgerichtshof recognized
and enforced ajudgment of a California court with respect to damages under a number of heads but refused to enforce the punitive
28 7
damages part of the judgment, citing reasons of "public policy.
Similar approaches have been taken with respect to punitive dam28
ages by courts in jurisdictions such asJapan. 1
The use of a public policy exception with respect to punitive
damage awards would be an expansion from the very restricted use
of the exception in contemporary conflict of laws in common law
jurisdictions, 2 9 and would seem to run counter to a regime of
expanding international policy values. However, such expansion is
a potentially sensible change to accompany a more liberalized
regime of recognition and enforcement ofjudgments.
A good example of the significance of the differences in punitive
damages is found in the 1995 judgment of a Mississippi state court
California judgment that included a substantial award for emotional distress
damages. The judge seemed particularly concerned about the quantum of the
damages awarded in comparison to the caps on recovery of such damages in
Canada.
286 See Weintraub, supranote 86 at 203-05.
1

s7 Judgment ofJune 4, 1992, 13 ZIP 1256 (1992), (1993) 3 2 I.L.M. 132o. See H.

Bungert, "Enforcing U.S. Excessive and Punitive Damages Awards in Germany"
(1993) 27 Int'l Lawyer 1075; P. Hay, "The Recognition and Enforcement of
American Money-Judgments in Germany- The 1992 Decision of the German
Supreme Court" (1992) 4 Am.J. Comp. L. 729; Brand, supra note 166 at
6o8-13.
288 See, for example, An Oregon Partnership,Northcon Iv. Yoshitaka Katayama;Mansei

KogyoKabushikiKaisha, H.J.(1376) 79 [1991], H.T. (76o) 250 [1991] (Tokyo
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District Court, 18 February 1991) reported at (1992) 35 Japanese Annual Int'l
L. 177; see Brand, supra note 166 at 6i 2.
Castel, supra note i o at 17 1-74.
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in O'Keefe v. Loewen Group, Inc., et aL2 90 In a jury trial, the Loewen
Group, a funeral home company based in Burnaby, Canada, was
found to have been in breach of contract in a commercial dispute
concerning licenses and negotiations connected to the takeover
by Loewen of some funeral homes in Mississippi. The property in
dispute involved three contracts valued at US $i million and an
exchange of funeral homes worth US $2.5 million for an insurance
property valued at US $4 million. The jury awarded US $1oo million in compensatory damages and US $400 million in punitive
damages. Faced with this award, Loewen sought to appeal. Partly
based on a Mississippi rule that required posting of a 125 per cent
bond, which in this case would have totalled US $625 million,
Loewen eventually settled for approximately $175 million. Loewen
subsequently went into reorganization under bankruptcy laws. In
an interesting indication of the convergence of private law and
international trade law, Loewen and its founder Ray Loewen have
also filed a complaint under the NAFTA investment chapter seeking damages. 291 Whatever the merits of the Mississippi judgment
as the basis for a claim in international trade law, the refusal by a
Canadian court of enforcement of some part of the judgment in
the Loewen case might have been an appropriate expression of the
differences in views between Canada and Mississippi as to the size
of awards and the purpose of punishment served by punitive damage awards.
The different scale of punitive damages between the United
States and Canada reflects different underlying views of the uses of
civil litigation as a tool of regulatory policy and of the purposes
of deterrence and punishment. In the United States, civil litigation
is an important part of the regulatory framework through a system
of countervailing power. The system of "private attorneys general"
.. O'Keefev. The Loewen GroupInc. etal., 91-67-423 (Cir.Ct, Hinds Co., Miss. 1995).
291 Loewen v. United States, supra note 187. The claim was filed under the private-

party investor dispute settlement provisions of Section B, Chapter i i of
NAFTA, supranote 187. The substantive claim is based on Articles 1 102, 1105,
and 11 o of NAFTA. See "NAFIA Panel Expected to be Constituted Soon in
Canadian Firm's $725 Million NAFTA Claim" January 2o, 1999, BNA Int'l
Trade Reporter 81; M. Krauss, "NAFTA Meets the American Torts Process:
O'Keefe v. Loewen" (2ooo) 9 George Mason. L. Rev. 69. An initial ruling of the
panel rejected arguments by the United States on matters of competence and
jurisdiction; see The Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of
America (ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/ 9 8/ 3 ), Decision of the Arbitral Tribunal
on Hearing of Respondent's Objection to Competence andJurisdiction (January5, 2001).
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in areas such as securities regulation and antitrust demonstrate
the significance of regulation through private actions in the United
States. The US system of antitrust litigation mixes government regulation and private litigation. The award of treble damages is an
important part of this system. Treble damages are also available
for certain kinds of private actions under the Securities Exchange
Act. 292 The degree to which Canada and US legislators have different
views of private litigation and the quantum of damages is reflected
in Canadian legislation that permits the "clawback" of such treble
293
damage awards.
From an international trade perspective, the punitive damage
awards may themselves be as suspect as the refusal of a foreign
court to recognize and enforce such awards. The punitive damage
awards may be motivated by parochial dislike of foreigners who
conduct business in a jurisdiction. The scale of such awards may
also amount to defacto discrimination, in that foreign competitors
may either be dissuaded from entry into the local market or forced
to take out expensive forms of liability insurance, especially given
that they already face public law regulation in their home jurisdictions. More generally, such awards may be economically inefficient
in providing over-deterrence, in particular, where they serve a purely
punitive, rather than a deterrent, function. Indeed, even within the
United States, substantial debate exists as to the utility of punitive
94
damages beyond a certain quantum.
Even under ideas of international cooperation among liberal
states, it is not clear that a Canadian jurisdiction should necessarily
recognize and enforce judgments with which it disagrees. Slaughter, for example, has written that with respect to the Act of State
doctrine national courts should feel less worried about deference
292 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78 (1934).
293 See, for example, Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, supranote 189; Castel

et al., supranote 71 at 645-46.
294 Substantial disagreement about punitive damages is reflected in debates within

the United States itself. Weintraub observes that in international negotiations
concerning the recognition and enforcement of US judgments, "[d] efense of
punitive damages will not be helped by the fact that most states have, by statute
or decision, placed limits on punitive awards and that the U.S. Supreme Court
has held that a 'grossly excessive' award of punitive damages violates due
process"; Weintraub, supra note 86 at 182-83 [notes omitted]. The Mississippi
judgment against Loewen features prominently as a chapter in a conservative
journalist's book severely criticizing the legal system in the United States; M.
Boot, Out of Order: Arrogance, Corruption, and Incompetence on the Bench (New
York: Basic Books, 1998) at 158-6o; see also Krauss, supra note 291.
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to foreign courts of jurisdictions that share common basic values
and institutions because there is less risk of ideologically motivated
interference with the foreign jurisdiction. 295 Transjudicial dialogue
among the courts of liberal jurisdictions should include the ability
to engage in more critical dialogue concerningjudgments.
With this understanding, the approach of refusing to enforce
some part of a foreign punitive damages award seems like a tailored,
compromise solution. A plaintiff is not left with a uselessjudgment.
Most of the other heads of damages, which may be substantial, will
be recognized against Canadian assets of the defendant. Often, defendants, especially corporate defendants, have assets in otherjurisdictions against which the plaintiff may be able to enforce even the
punitive damages component of the judgment. Finally, the plaintiff
always has the option of commencing an action in the Canadian
jurisdiction if most of the assets are in Canada. The judgment
will be enforceable to the full extent in the forum jurisdiction and
partly enforceable in the foreign jurisdiction. This seems to be a
rough compromise reflecting the fact that both jurisdictions have
connections to the matter but disagree as to the applicable results
in the dispute. It may also best reflect the legitimate expectations of
fairness of both parties to the litigation.
PART

7:

CONCLUSION

The judgments of the tetralogy have brought the policy dimensions of internationalization clearly into the centre of law-making
and adjudication in Canadian private international law. It seems
clear that legal actors - including legislators, judges, and practitioners - must master the features of this internationalist discourse
in order to make good decisions and to be effective advocates in
today's terrain of private international law and other aspects of law,
which are impacted by globalization and internationalization.
The danger is that the new discourse of internationalism will be
misunderstood as a narrow apology for only a limited kind of doctrinal reform and a narrow definition of the policy purposes of private international law in an era of globalization. There is nothing
about any one of the international policy objectives - international
commerce, interstate cooperation, or cosmopolitan fairness - that
compels ignoring other policy objectives in the field. Indeed, general
215A-M. Burley, "Law among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act
of State Doctrine" (1992) 92 Columbia L. Rev. 1907 at 1975-85 and 1993.
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policy objectives such as international commerce, interstate cooperation, and cosmopolitan fairness often are indeterminate with
respect to particular doctrinal reforms. In order to understand the
nature and the limits of internationalist reform better, it is necessary to examine some of the personal, national and historical contexts for such reforms. This article situated the internationalist
policy discourse of the tetralogy in the contexts of traditions of
liberal internationalism, Canadian internationalism, and the disciplinary internationalism of public international law. By situating
the policy discourse in this way, the article attempted to give a better sense of how the openness of internationalist policy justifications can become narrow and be misused to exclude valid policy
concerns.
The tetralogy also shows how courts play an active role in constituting the legal terrain of the international system. The judgments
show how concepts and ideational orientations about the international realm can lead to concrete results. Hopefully, a critical
understanding of the tetralogy will provide a sense of how debates
about internationalism can be productively used in debates about
private international law and other fields impacted by internationalization. The strengths and limits of the policy argumentation in
the tetralogy are symptomatic of other policy debates concerning
the global and the international in Canada as elsewhere. For example, recent controversies concerning international trade regulation,
such as the defeat of the proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment, the failures of the 1999 Seattle Ministerial Meeting of the

World Trade Organization, and the protests at the 2OOl Qu~bec
meetings concerning the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas, indicate substantial resistance to further expansion of the international trading order. This resistance is at least partly a response
to a policy focus in international trade regulation on a narrow set
of liberal internationalist objectives centred on promoting international commerce, facilitating inter-state relations, and promoting a
shallow and economistic conception of non-discrimination. 296 Moreover, the willingness on the part of governments to suppress critical
policy discussion at the APEC meetings in Vancouver in 1997297
and at the FTAA meetings in Quebec may be symptomatic of a
Unfortunately, some such resistance tends toward equally naive antiinternationalist positions rather than carefully articulated policy analysis and
response.
7 See W. Pue, PepperinOurEyes: The APECAffair (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000).
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narrow policy concept of internationalism. The policy aspects of
the internationalist reform of private international law in Canada
suggests that being for the international must also be about debating the international.

Sommaire
Au nom de l'international: La Cour supreme du Canada et la mtamorphose internationaliste du droit international priv6 canadien
Cet articleexamine quatre arritsde la Cour supreme du Canadaqui ont eu
poureffet de transformerle droit internationalpriv au Canada, les prsentant comme un ipisode remarquabledans 1internationalisationdu droit,
un genre d'activismejudiciaireau nom de 1international.Selon l'auteur,
ces arrtsrev~lent un modle d 'nternationalisationfond sur la conscience
politiqueinternationaliste,distinctmais souvent complementairede linternationalisationau moyen de traitis internationauxet de changements au
droit internationalcoutumier Les traitssaillantsde cette approchesemblent
prisenterdes ressemblancesavec les traditionsde 1internationalismeliberal,
de lnternationalismecanadien et du droit internationalpublic. L'article
fait une mise en garde contreplusieurs dangersd'ordregin~ralque souleve
le recours d cette approchepour la reforme du droit et le raisonnementjudiciaire. L'auteur mentionne en particulierdeux questions de doctrine en
droit internationalprivi afin d'illustrerune approcheplus sophistiquieti
une politique d internationalisme.

Summary
In the Name of the International: The Supreme Court of Canada
and the Internationalist Transformation of Canadian Private International Law
This article discussesfourjudgments of the Supreme Court of Canada that
transformedprivate internationallaw in Canada and represent a striking
episode in the internationalizationof law - a form ofjudicial activism
in the name of the international.It is argued that these cases evidence a
mode of internationalizationby internationalistpolicy consciousness that is
distinctfrom, although often complementary to, internationalizationvia
the mechanism of internationaltreaties or changes in customary international law. The key features of this approachsuggest some resemblances to
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the vision found in the traditions of liberal internationalism,Canadian
internationalism, and public international law. The article cautions
against several general dangers in the use of this approach in law reform
and adjudicationand uses two specific doctrinal issues in private international law to demonstrate what a richer policy discourse concerning
internationalismwould be.

